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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Interest in Of particular interest at this time
trade
are the trade agreements which are
being negotiated t>y the United States with foreign
countries under the Trade Agreements Act of June 1934.
In order to appreciate the significance of this Act
and the subsequent trade agreements, and their probable
effect on the lives and activities of our nation, it
would seem that we might benefit by looking a little
into the background of intercourse between the nations
for events which lead up to the present reciprocity
program.
The relationship between nations include,
beside trade, those items which have to do with in-
vestments, loans, interest payments, remittances, gold
movements, and many others. However, since so often,
when we talk about nations dealing one with the other,
we are concerned with the aspect of commerce or trade,
we will discuss in this thesis the trade of the United
States with foreign countries.
Scope of An attempt is made herein to comment
Thesis
briefly on the general trade practices
and some of the countries where they are now being

2carried on; to discuss to some extent the background of
the Reciprocity policy in the United States; and to
trace the tariff history of the United States, giving a
few of the provisions and limitations.
It might be well to pause here to make clear
what we mean by the term "reciprocity". Where each of
the parties to a treaty makes special concessions to the
other with the intention that the transactions shall be
looked upon as a particular bargain and with the under-
standing that its benefits are not to be extended auto-
matically, generally, and freely to other States, the
agreement is called a "reciprocity agreement"."^
With our historical basis, then, the thesis
will go on to comment on the Trade Agreements Act, its
provisions, the pre-negotiation and drafting procedure,
cuid the countries with whom agreements have been con-
cluded under the Act. It will cite specific agreements
and comment on some of the provisions thereof and their
implications. An attempt to evaluate somewhat these
treaties and their effect on trade and national economy
will be made; and to discuss the relative merits (or
demerits) of economic nationalism and reciprocal trade
relations; and to forecast the possible future of the
program.
1. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties ; United States
Tariff Commission, Washington; Government Printing Office,
1919, Page 17.

3It i_s an important problem and a vital one and
demands that we give it our careful consideration after
we have acquainted ourselves with the situation as best
we can. The situation summed up, is this, as I see it.
Present Trade between nations is really trade
Situation
in Trade between individuals living in different
countries and is, in many respects, exactly similar to
trade among individuals in a single country. It takes
place for the same reasons that it takes place between
individuals living in different sections of the same
country; namely, because countries have specialized and
can obtain some things they need more easily by offering
their own special products in exchange for them than by
producing them in their own area. In other words, the
principle underlying international trade is the principle
of territorial specialization.
The difference in physical and climatic con-
ditions, the distribution of raw materials, the division
of labor and the differing degree of technological de-
velopment throughout the world make it necessary for
nations to exchange their goods and services for those
of other countries if the most favorable world conditions
are to be achieved. Foreign trade is beneficial to all
countries alike. It is profitable for each nation to
develop those Industries in which it has particular
natural or technological advantages to produce beyond

4domestic requirements . Each nation has come to depend
upon other countries as markets for this excess pro-
duction. In a like manner every country is dependent
upon others to supply those goods which it is unable to
produce at all, or in insufficient quantities to satisfy
domestic needs. Therefore, it is to the advantage of all
2
nations to trade with each other.
There was a time when it was commonly believed
that a nation should export as much as possible at the
same time importing as little as possible, and so create
what is termed a "favorable balance of trade". This is
the well-known Mercantile Theory. But Foreign Trade im-
plies a two-way traffic; to sell, we must buy. Exporting
is only one phase of foreign trade and should not be per-
mitted to obscure the importance of imports. Indeed it
is scarcely an exaggeration to say that we engage in ex-
port trade as a nation primarily to permit us to import
the many indispensable commodities which we could not
otherwise enjoy.
The difference between the value of exports
over the value of imports cannot, however, be accepted
as correctly representing the condition of our foreign
trade. These figures refer only to traffic in commodi-
ties. There are other items, termed "invisible" items.
2. Taken from remarks of the Honorable Daniel C. Roper,
Secretary of Commerce, before a Foreign Trade Promotion
Meeting in Washington, D. C, May 19, 1936.

5which are Inevitable and must be considered before we
attempt to measure any balance of trade. These invisi-
ble items include: payments made by American shippers
to owners of foreign vessels on which the Americans ship
their goods; insurance premiums paid to foreign insurance
companies for goods shipped on foreign vessels; remit-
tances sent to their homes by foreigners living in the
United States; travel expenses paid out by foreigners in
the United States; travel expenses paid out by Americans
traveling in European countries; payments in the form of
interest and dividends which are sent to holders of
American securities living in Europe; loans which are
made by American bankers to foreign countries. All of
these items will affect the balance between imports and
exports of a country.
The endless discussions of the nature of for-
eign trade which set in with the argument over the possi-
bility of the political debts being paid in any way except
in goods and services has gradually educated the public
to the view that foreign trade is not a one-sided affair
so far as goods are concerned. The public is beginning
to grasp the idea that getting money for substantial
wealth is not so different from selling to foreigners on
their tenuous promises to pay twenty or thirty years hence.
Imports of goods pay for exports of goods; wealth is re-
ceived in exchange for wealth.

6So long as the public had the simple convic-
tion that money was the objective of international trade,
imports were regarded as little better than armed invaders.

7CliAPTER II
TRADE POLICIES
Economic As nations traded back and forth among
Policies
each other, the manner in which they
treated imports very soon devolved into methods , each
coimtry determining upon, and accepting the one which it
thought the most advantageous to its own domestic welfare.
Needless to say, the keynote, or core, of the policies
was "protection". Another reason for tariffs or duties
was revenue, with ad valorem or specific duties levied.
For "protection", duties were levied on equivalent foreign
commodities. Such protection is designed either to com-
pensate for the difference between conditions governing
the situation at home and in the country of the principal
competitor (countervailing duties) or to create a privi-
leged situation for the home market to the detriment of
the foreign commodity (protective duties).
The form of tariff protection is a result of
a country's economic policy, very often expressed by the
views of those in power. The degree of protection varies
with the commodities and in relation to the stage of de-
velopment of the various industries and the interdepend-
ence of their branches
.
/
8Tariff protection is also affected by consider-
ation of financial policy. Too often It Is the football
of political parties and changes with change of adminis-
tration or balance of power.
Too, Governments may draw up their tariffs as
a means of commercial bargaining.
Bargaining All of these reasons for tariffs exist
Incentive
but the bargaining incentive is in the
foreground at the present time. The means by which terms
are reached are many; some produce desired results; others
produce retaliation. Unfortunately, there has been much
of the "eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth" reaction since
the Hawley-Smoot Tariff of the United States.
These means of bargaining between countries
depend largely upon the motives of the contractual par-
ties. A country may want: (1) to secure equal advan-
tages with competitors in foreign markets, so that their
own products may not be subject to any changes in respect
to Customs duties which are not imposed on the commodi-
ties of all other competitors, and that they may be
granted to other competitors. This guarantee is called
the "most-favored-nation treatm.ent"; (2) to ensure that
the products of the other contracting party shall only
enjoy a reasonable measure of tariff protection, and not
a measure so large as to prevent all competition by foreign
products, as gained through minim\im tariff or conventional

9duties; (3) to maintain a just balance between the ad-
vantages obtained and those given in order to enjoy the
same commercial advantages as the other contracting party.
These advantages will be either identical or equivalent
to one another.^
The tariffs which operate under a system of
bargaining will differ, depending to a large extent on
the individual country, its domestic state of well-being
and its motive in bargaining.
4
Tariffs may be classified as:
1. Autonomous tariffs—a single statutory
tariff, drawn up solely with a view to fiscal, economic
and social requirements of the particular nation, and is
applied equally to all contracting parties in commercial
treaties. This is associated with a principle of non-
disc rimlnat 1 on
.
This system is best suited to a self-sufficient
nation which depends little on foreign supply for con-
sumption or trade, and is concentrating on the develop-
ment of home Industry and home markets.
2. Autonomous tariffs subject to increase
—
since autonomous tariffs grant to contracting parties
only the degree of equality which each undertakes, dis-
3. League of Nations
,
May 29, 1937, Economic and Finan-
cial Section. . .International economic conference, Geneva.
Documentation, Commercial Treaties: tariff systems and
contractual methods, by D. Serruys, Page 3.
4. Ibid. Page 5.
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crimination may arise through the duties on principal
commodities exported by one country being higher than
those on the principal commodities exported by the other.
Because of this, some countries who operate
under an autonomous tariff have retained means of retali-
ating against countries in which their exports would be
subject to differential or burdensome duties. Some
governments used these powers as a sort of warning in
support of their demand for favorable treatment.
3. Autonomous Tariffs subject to conventional
reductions—the threat of added duties, as penalties, has
some value but not near as much as the power of the coun-
try to set duties at such a rate so that they may be
lowered in return for a concession granted by a con-
tracting country.
There were two ways of handling these reduc-
tions :
(a) publishing tariff rates so that
countries could begin to negotiate if they
desired reduced rates; then having the rates
go into effect at the end of the negotiation;
(b) setting the tariff rates into effect
immediately; since the rates are almost pro-
hibitive, the other coimtries have no alterna-
tive but to enter into negotiations for lower
duties
.
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4. Double Tariff system is one in which a
minimiim tariff is set up, which is the level of the needs
of national industry and therefore, cannot be lowered.
A maximum tariff is also set, applicable to countries with
which commercial treaties have not been made, forcing them
either out of the market or into negotiations. The dif-
ference between the minimum and maximum tariff would un-
doubtedly vary according to the nature of the commodity,
the degree to' which the home market depends upon foreign
supply, and the conditions governing competition abroad.
The minimum tariff is an autonomous one, subject neither
to reduction or consolidation, so that the country intro-
ducing it retains the degree of protection which it thinks
necessary, as well as the power to adapt this protection,
if need be, to new requirements.
The disadvantages of the double tariff system,
since it was first introduced in France, in 1892, have
been felt to be mainly in the negotiation of treaties.
5
They are:
A. Once a country had granted its minimum
tariff to another country, it had no further means of
bargaining, since it can neither reduce or consolidate
its rates
.
5. League of Nations
,
May 29, 1937, Economic and Finan-
cial Section. . .International economic conference, Geneva.
Documentation, Commercial Treaties: tariff systems and
contractual methods, by D. Serruys, Page 8.

12
B. If the minimum rates are fixed at a rate
which appears to be prohibitive to another country's prod-
ucts, there is no possibility of concluding a treaty
with that country,
France has sought to overcome these difficul-
ties by the use of intermediate duties between the two
tariffs. Attempt to help bargaining power is made by
granting minimum rates to some products and reserving
the right to subject other products to intermediate duties
or even general duties depending upon the concessions
granted to her.
Spain attempts to overcome the level of the
minimum rate by using it as an autonomous tariff subject
to a reduction and consolidation within certain limits
only.
6. Preferential tariffs combined with auto-
nomous or with double tariffs—because of geographical
location or political conditions preferential rates have
resulted. With some of these we are already familiar,
(a) Imperial Preference—the British
Dominions reserve the right to grant to the
United Kingdom or other members of the British
Commonwealth tariff rates which cannot be
claimed by other parties in virtue of the moat-
favored-nation clause.
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(b) Territorial contiguity has justified
recognized preferential rates as between Spain
and Portugal, and Canada and the United States.
Motives for Our treaties or agreements revolve
Negotiation
around the motive for their negotiation.
The oldest and most general of these is the desire to ob-
tain equal trade rights. Each nation when entering into
a trade agreement wants to protect its ovm. exports from
dlscriralnatlons in the form of privileges granted to the
same or similar exports of a competitor.
This system does not insure continuity of treat-
ment, since by the terms of the agreement, the contracting
party offers no guarantee but that of equality, and re-
tains the liberty of introducing at any time tariffs v/hlch
have not been the subject of any previous stipulation In
respect to character or rate.
Another contrasting method, and one which is
almost synonomous with the word trade, is knovm as the
most-favored-natlon treatment. This clause states that
"any favor or privilege which may hereafter be granted,
either in virtue of autonomous measures or in virtue
of commercial conventions, to the commodities of any third
state whatsoever shall be extended to the like or similar
commodities of the other contracting party.
The most-favored-nation treatment provides for
the extension of further privilege to the third party as
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its natural right. Thus, it not only protects the latter
from any form of discrimination but also holds out the
prospect of an improvement in the treatment offered by
the original agreement
.
There have been objections made to the most-
favored-nation clause treatment on the grounds that:
1. The most-favored-nation clause places at
a disadvsmtage governments which are prevented by their
laws from bargaining on their autonomous tariffs as com-
pared with governments which can reduce their rates by
convention, for, once the former have granted the latter
equal treatment with most-favored third parties, they
have no firrther means of favorable treatment for their
own commodities except by reciprocal concessions, unless
they modify their own tariff systems.
2. The most-favored-nation clause encourages
countries to raise their tariffs since they are obliged
under their agreements to apply the same duties to the
strongest as to the weakest competitors, and must ac-
cordingly fix the duties in proportion to the more serious
danger.
De facto reciprocity has been the kind of
reciprocity which has resulted from the commercial
treaties negotiated since the end of the 18th century.
The attempt has given rise to a series of dif-
ferent contractual systems, among which are:
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Conditional In an attempt to secure a certain
most-favored-
nation treatment measure of de facto reciprocity, there
was inserted in a treaty, concluded between the United
States and France in 17S7, a conditional most-favored-
nation clause "by which each contracting nation benefits
unconditionally by any immunity or privilege which the
other party may subsequently grant unconditionally to a
third party, but is not entitled to claim any privileges
granted on specific conditions to a third party unless
it fulfills the same conditions
.
Under this system, certain privileges would be
granted to a contracting party in return for a specific
consideration, and they could only be claimed by other
countries, because of most-favored-nation clause, in
return for the same consideration.
The objections to this policy may be stated as:
1. It is not always possible for one country
to offer the same considerations as is given by another.
Eventually equivalent compensation was substituted for
identical compensation, but this brought forth a contro-
versy of what are equivalent considerations.
2. The use of the conditional clause has led
to some countries setting up duties which only a certain
country can fulfill, thus making the conditional clause
one of discrimination.

16
De facto Reel- In order to avoid the disadvantage of
procity 1 Imited
to certain the conditional clause, the United
Commodities
States, carried out during the 19th
century a number of progressive experiments.
1. They drew up lists of commodities imported
from their principal customers; these articles were
penalized if the countries in question subjected the ex-
ports of the United States to discrimination or unfavor-
able treatment
.
2. They drew up lists of rates which might be
lowered at the request of contracting parties, provided
that the latter extended equal or raost-favored-nation
treatment to all or part of the American commodities they
imported,
3. They drew up commodities imported from their
principal customers; these articles were admitted at
privileged rates provided that the treatment was extended
to all or part of the United States commodities which
they imported.
The Dingley Bill provided for all three of these
forms of reciprocity, but only the first two were applied
—
for instance, in the "Argol Agreements"—whereas the agree-
ments negotiated by Mr. Kasson, containing the third form,
were all rejected by the Senate.

17
Conventional This aims to secure de facto reciprocity
Duties
by means of commercial treaties based on
the raost-favored-nation clause. The method used was to
claim and grant conventional duties for the principal
commodities exported by the contracting parties.
This method meets both the requirements of a
guarantee for equality of treatment, while bargaining Is
effectively provided for by the possibility of offering
lower rates.
Treaties concluded on this basis usually in-
clude a clause in which commodities of particular impor-
tance to either contracting party are subject to conven-
tional rates, detailed on attached lists. Thus the
autonomous tariff of a country which applies this system
is gradually replaced by a conventional tariff, built up
with the concessions successively granted to countries
with which treaties have been concluded.
Some disadvantages of this practice of combin-
ing the most-favored-nation clause with the granting of
conventional rates for commodities are:
1, Conventional duties have been so specialized
that they apply to only one country, thereby being dis-
criminatory for all others
.
^* ^g&S^g of Nations , May 29, 1937, Economic and Finan-
clai Section. . .International economic conference, Geneva.
Documentation, Commercial Treaties: tariff systems and
contractual methods, by D. Serruys, Page 12.
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2. Autonomous tariffs drawn up with a view
to conventional reductions have often been fixed at so
high a level that there is provided more scope for bar-
gaining--or the other party is compelled to negotiate
because the tariff wall is prohibitive.
Through commercial treaties Governments aim to
establish permanent markets abroad.
"The objection to the different contractual
methods, as a whole, consists in the diversity of the
conceptions which they represent and of the methods by
which it is sought to express these conceptions. Nego-
tiation is made difficult as much by the multiplicity of
systems as by their incompatibility.
"A compromise may indeed be possible between
Governments which employ the general most-favored-nation
clause and those which adopt the principle of commercial
equality and grant no privileges. It has also been
possible for Governments which levy conventional duties
to reach compromises with those which employ a minimum
tariff and exclude conventional duties. Failing identity
of system, it is possible to aim at equivalent advantages.
Nevertheless, contractual methods continue to become more
complicated, and it is perhaps less important to discuss
the advantages or disadvantages of any one method than to
seek the means by which different methods may be recon-
ciled or to discover compromises by which, in spite of

19
their diversity, they may be made to afford all the
guarantees which are required by Governments desirous
of placing their commercial relations on a stable and
7
satisfactory basis."
A this point we might comment briefly on the
foreign trade policies of two of the large nations in
Europe, those of Great Britain and Germany.
Policy of Great Britain's policy is largely self-
Great Britain
contained, and is a unique attempt to
bind together through preferential agreements the far-
flung outposts of the British Empire. Thus the essence
of Empire preferences is as largely political as it is
economic. It attempts on the economic side, however, to
provide mutual outlets for the wares of British industry
and for those of the Empire Commonwealth. One of its
aims has also been to protect and develop certain infant
industries in the colonial frontiers. Indeed it is es-
sentially a recrudescence of mercantilism, an effort to
revive the flow of commerce by whatever makeshift in a
topsy-turvy world.
^
The German program is entirely different, but
of equally great interest to a student of the commercial
7. League of Nations
,
May 29, 1937, Economic and Finan-
cial Section. • .International economic conference, Geneva.
Documentation, Commercial Treaties: tariff systems and
contractual methods, by D. Serruys, Page 14.
8. Harvard Business Review , Volume XVI No. 1, Autumn 1937,
Pg. 43, article by IM . H. iin^le on the Reciprocity Agree-
ments .
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policy. The Reich under the present regime has subjected
foreign trade to a severe and rigid straight jacket. Im-
ports are not only directly restricted, but are also re-
gulated by strict control of foreign exchange.
Four methods of control are used: (1) require-
ment of a foreign exchange certificate or similar document,
(2) the establishment of rigidly controlled monopolies
of specified agricultural products and derivatives,
(3) the requirement of import permits, (4) miscel-
laneous controls including sanitary, public safety, mlx-
9ings and other regulations.
9. Harvard Business Review , Volume XVI No. 1, Autumn 1937,
Page 45, article by . H. Engie on the Reciprocity Agree-
ments .
J
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CHAPTER III
SURVEY OF TIffi RECIPROCITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
Chester A. Arthur, twenty-first President of
the United States, was the author of what is known as
the Reciprocity Policy for promoting the export trade
of the United States, However, a reciprocity treaty
with Canada was negotiated by William L. Marcy and
Lord Elgin in 1854 and continued in from March 16, 1855,
until March 16, 1865, but it was unsatisfactory to both
countries, because it did not go far enough. It pro-
vided for a free interchange between the two countries
of natural products from the farm, and sea, and mine,
but included no manufactured products, which were not
produced to any extent in Canada and were still heavily
taxed. Also it did not admit Canadian vessels to the
American coasting trade. "'"^
Treaty with The treaty achieved the principal reason
Canada
for which it was made—the relief of the
tension over the fisheries controversy; but it did not
simulate the American fishing industry. The opening of
the St. Lawrence River and the Canadian canals to American
10. Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science ,^^y 1907, Vol. XXIX,"TJo. 3, "Development
of the Foreign Trade of the United States, Page 15.
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shipping did not result in an increase in American traffic
on those highways but it did allow for a choice of routes.
V/hen we attempt to evaluate the result of the
tariff chsmges on trade between the United States and
Canada, we must take into consideration factors, other
than trade, vyhich complicated the situation, e.g. increase
in population, improvement of transportation facilities,
a commercial crisis in both countries in 1857, and finally
the Civil War.
During the eleven years of the reciprocity
period, the total trade between the two countries increased
approximately three-fold, and for the United States, the
trade with Canada became second only to that with Great
Britain.
'^
The main causes which brought about the abroga-
tion of the treaty were the adoption of protectionist
principles and practices in Canada, the resentment aroused
in the United States by the attitude of Canada during the
Civil V/ar, and the need of increased revenues by both
countries. Along with these there was also the dissatis-
faction of the fish, lumber, and coal interests in the
United States.
The request for abrogation came from the United
States. For thirty years afterward, the Canadians con-
11. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties : United States
Tariff Commission, Washington; Government Printing: Office,
1919, Page 78.
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tlnued to seek reciprocity treaties with no success.
The treaty of Washington In 1371 which disposed,
among other things, of the fisheries and waterways con-
troversies, was disappointment to the Canadian people.
They felt that all their efforts toward reciprocity had
been thwarted by this act of the British Government.
Subsequent efforts on the part of Canada to
enter Into negotiations with the United States were re-
buffed, with the result that Canadian public sentiment
was aroused toward a "National", self-sufficiency policy
and reciprocity was not again attempted until 1910.
Treaty with In 1875, a reciprocity treaty was con-
Hawaii
eluded betv/een Hawaii and the United
States. The treaty, which was in operation for twenty-
five years, was a product of political rather than of
economic considerations.
The location, resources, and political weakness
of Hawaii made the islands attractive to several strong
nations. It was inevitable that the United States should
be a bit uneasy about their coming under control of any
other power.
In 1851 the King of Hawaii prepared to place
Hawaii under the protection of the United States to
escape the aggression of a European power. An Annexation
Treaty was negotiated in 1854 but was not concluded. The
next year, and also in 1867, reciprocity agreements were
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negotiated but not ratified. In 1874 another reciprocity
treaty was negotiated and ratified the following year.
In 1882, when the treaty came up for renewal,
it was admitted that commercially, Hawaii reaped more
benefits from the treaty than did the United States.
However, political considerations weighed more heavily
than commercial ones and the treaty was extended with a
provision for the cession of Pearl River Harbor to the
United States as a naval base.
The chief consideration which Hawaii received
from the United States was the admission, duty free, of
the specified products originating in the islands, while
similar commodities, when coming from other sources were
subjected to substantial rates of duty. The special
preference, not the free admission, was the significant
feature so far as the effect on Hawaiian Exports was con-
cerned.
It is agreed that economically, the Hawaiian
Treaty was unprofitable to the United States. However,
when the treaty was concluded, it was recognized that
political considerations outweighed commercial ones.
Since the tariff act of 1890 provided for the
imposition of penalty duties upon imports from countries
which discriminated in their tariff treatment against
goods from the United States, it is considered to be the
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first authorization ever given by Congress for a com-
12
prehensive program of tariff bargaining.
Congress aimed by this act to secure more
favorable trade relations with other countries by penal-
izing such countries as did not treat American products
favorably rather than by following the method which had
been favored by the administration—that of remitting or
lowering duties on the products of coimtries which in
return would make similar tariff concessions. The act
gave the President, within prescribed limits, a free
hand in negotiations
.
Under the terms of this act, Secretary of State,
Blaine, began the negotiation of a series of agreements.
Between January 31, 1891, and May 26, 1892, ten reciproc-
ity arrangements were concluded. In most cases, the other
contracting party agreed to admit free, or at substantially
reduced tariff rates, the bulk of its Imports from the
United States
.
During the period of these reciprocity treaties
penalties were fairly effective, both as measures of re-
taliations and as a means of securing tariff concessions.
Exports from the United States to the reciproclt^r coun-
tries, showed a substantial Increase.
12. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties : United States
Tariff Commission, Washington: Government Printing Office,
1919 .
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In 1894, the Democratic administration passed
a tariff act which did away with the reciprocity provision.
Act of 1896 In 1896, with the incoming of the Republi-
can Party, there caine a tariff act which again provided for
negotiation of treaties and tariff bargaining. President
McKinley appointed John A. Kasson, of Iowa, as special
commissioner to be assisted by a "reciprocity commission",
for the negotiation of agreements under the act.
Two series of agreements known as the "argol
agreements" were concluded. The first agreements were
with France, Portugal, Germany, and Italy.
An indirect result of the conclusion of these
agreements was that Switzerland, through the uncondi-
tional most-favored-nation clause of her treat3'- of 1850
v/ith the United States, claimed and was given, without
compensation, the benefit of the concessions extended by
treaty to Frsince. The most-favored-nation treaty pro-
vision upon which Switzerland based her claim was promptly
denounced by the United States with due notice, suid in
13March 1900, ceased to be operative.
In December 1899, the Kasson treaties were pre-
sented for ratification but failed to be ratified. In
1909 the tariff act provided for giving to all countries
13. Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties ; United States
Tariff Commission, Washington; Government Printing Office,
1919, Page 208.
30xxcf0flei!>
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other than Cuba notice of termination of their reciproc-
ity agreements with the United States
.
Treaty with A treaty of much importance was that
Cuba
made with Cuba in 1902. The close
political relations of the United States with Cuba after
the Spanish-American war brought Cuba into the position
of seeking continued relationships with the United States.
Public opinion in the United States developed in favor of
closer economic relations betv/een the two coxmtries and
this led up to the treaty of 1902.
The bill provided for a reduction of 20 per
cent from the American duties on Cuban imports and re-
ductions of from 20 to 40 per cent from the Cuban rates
on American products. The treaty required the approval
of Congress.
This treaty was independent of the reciprocal
provisions of the act of 1897, and v/as not connected with
the treaties negotiated under that act. It contained the
provision that the reductions in duty specified should
not be extended to any other country, that during the
continuance of the treaty no Cuban sugar should be ad-
mitted to the United States at a rate of duty lower than
that provided by the act of 1897.
The exports to Cuba from the United States are
more marked than the imports from Cuba. The articles of
export seem to have varied directly with the amount of
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preference received. The fact must not be overlooked
that these increases in trade with Cuba have been due
not only to the treaty of 1902, but also in considerable
part to the favorable influence upon Cuba of the recon-
struction program carried out mder the assurance of law
and order guaranteed by the treaty of 1903. The close
political relations between the United States and Cuba,
the investment of American capital, the development in
the United States of a large-scale export trade in manu-
factures, and the settlement in Cuba of Americans--these
and other factors have operated along with the tariff pref
erence to increase the trade between the two countries.
In 1910-11, another attempt was made to have
reciprocal trade treatment with Canada. Negotiations
were carried on to arrive at duty reductions and changes
in general tariff rates as they applied to various prod-
ucts. Eventually a treaty was arrived at, passed by the
United States Legislature and became an Act on the
statute books of the United States. However, Parliament
in Canada failed to pass on the treaty. Therefore, it
failed to be put into effect.
Summing up the reciprocity background of the
United States we conclude that the reciprocity experience
under the Tariff Acts of 1890 and 1897 taught us certain
things to avoid. Each of the three methods contained or
developed defects. Experiences with penalty or additional
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duties under the Act of 1890 revealed that this method
alone was not adequate and It was supplemented in the
Act of 1897 by the concessional method without abandon-
ing the penalty method. The argol agreements were
satisfactory so far as they went but they showed that no
adequate policy can be built on a small list of noncom-
petitive products, and no long and important list of non
competitive articles can be formed. Then, the failure
of the Kasson treaties demonstrated the futility of a
reciprocity policy which provides that Congress shall
14
debate each agreement.
The success of reciprocity under the Acts of
1890 and 1897 was limited by the negative and confining
effect of the conditional most-favored-nation clause in
our commercial treaty structure. The evil effects of
this policy were corrected by the adoption in 1922 of
the unconditional most-favored-nation principle.
In spite of their defects, however, the reci-
procity methods of 1890 and 1897 pioneered in the field
of systematic reciprocity. Although they taught us
many things not to do, they also moved reciprocity into
a position of national policy.
We have come along from these pioneering days
through the conditional most-favored-nation clause to
14. Reciprocity—A National Policy for Foreign Trade,
by William S. Culbertson, published by McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., Whittlesey House, 1937, Page 162.
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the unconditional-most-favored-natlon principle, slowly
Incorporating the principle of reciprocity into our
national policy. 3y careful and patient planning we are
now trying to undo much of the harm of retaliatory
measures which resulted from our Hawley-Smoot Tariff, by
taking the Initial step in negotiating treaties under
our Trade Agreements Act of 1934. We seek a flexibility
of tariffs, under systematic reciprocity, based on rules
fixed by Congress but administered by the Executive
without action by Congress on individual agreements,
and which makes the unconditional most-favored-nation
principle an active instrument for the establishment of
15
equal commercial treatment in world commerce
.
15. Reciprocity—A National Policy for Foreign Trade,
by William S. Culbertson, published by McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., Whittlesey House, 1937, Page 174.
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CHAPTER IV
BRIEF HISTORY OF TARIFFS IN TIffi UNITED STATES
Importance of There has never been a time in the
Foreign Trade
history of this country when foreign
trade has not played a part in the economic life of the
people. Even in prehistoric times, we learn from arche-
ological research that there is evidence of a flow of a
primitive form of traffic from Asia by way of Siberia,
the Aleutian Islands and Alaska down the coast of what
is now the United States , During the colonial era an
extensive trade was maintained by the mother countries
with their American colonies. Colonies were designed to
provide at once sources of raw materials and outlets for
the manufactured products of the mother country.
The steady growth of the foreign trade of the
United States represents an interesting contrast with
our changing commercial policy. Beginning as colonies
which were established under the restrictive mercantil-
istic policy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
we came gradually to resent interference with our commerce.
In fact, modem historians claim that the attempted en-
forcement of the Navigation Acts was the chief cause of
the Revolution. This would seem to have set the stage
for unrestricted world trade. The new nation, however,
was faced with the necessity for raising revenue and hence
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imposed import duties vvhich were in part protective to
certain American industries, especially the merchant
marine. Protection of infant industries soon 'becaine a
part of American commercial policy under the leadership
of Hamilton and the stimulus of the industrial revolu-
tion. There were shifts in emphasis, however, from
higher to lower tariffs as the old persistent mercantil-
istic theories waxed or waned, although the restrictive
policy of higher tariffs gained groiJind. Through it all
our foreign trade continued to expand as we gradually
pushed back the frontier and conquered the continent.
The point to remember is that as we grew rich and power-
ful our foreign trade grew also, reaching the imposing
total of over nine and one-half billions in 1929, and this
happened despite a policy which was well designed to curb it
Restrictions Notwithstanding the advantages of inter-
to Trade
national trade, such trade is restricted
to a greater or less degree by the imposition of customs
duties upon goods that cross the borders of any country.
A list of these goods and the rate of duty on each article
is called a tariff. Practically all countries levy import
duties on goods brought into the country. These duties
are termed "specific" ^en a certain amount of money is
levied for each physical unit of the commodity brought in,
16. Taken from an address by . H. Engle, Assistant
Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, De-
partment of Commerce, at Portland, Oregon, ^ay 19, 1936.
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and "ad valorem" if the tax Is a certain percentage of
the value of the commodity.
Tariffs are levied for three purposes: (a) As
a means of obtaining revenue for a country; (b) As a
means of keeping out certain foreign articles while a
nation is developing its own manufactories for such goods;
and (c) As a means of punishing or retaliating upon
other nations for imposing high rates
.
Tariff The first national tariff law in the
Legislation
United States was that of 1789. It has
been claimed that the industrial development of the United
States since 1390 has been due to the protective tariff,
although many economists attribute it to the country's
enormous natural resources. The case for and against the
protective tariff has been a political football since 1324,
and every four years American voters have sat back and
listened to the candidates for presidency argue pro and
con about the merits of a protective tariff, and it is
quite unfortunate that the tariff as an economic institu-
tion has become involved altogether too much with politi-
cal issues. Every time the administration changes from
Republican to Democratic it is a signal for an overhauling
of the tariff act, and often when the administration does
not change in party the tariff is fixed up anyhov;.
The first protective tariff initiated in 1816
was primarily to protect the infant industries . That had
(
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started during the embargo period centering about the
y/ar of 1812. This particular protective argument has
been based on the fact that the tariff is needed to
develop industries in their infancy which when once es-
tablished should be able to take care of themselves.
This form of protection, reasonably applied, is and has
been beneficial during the development and transition
period of some domestic industries. Unfortunately, this
form of protection often has been a cloak for all types
of extravagant rates and special benefits
.
As a corollary of the infant industry principle,
we have the vested industries argument that after an in-
dustry has once been established, and that since an
establishment has been encouraged by protection, there
must be a continuation of this protection. Such protec-
tion is considered by its proponents as a vested right.
Shortly after 1832, the movement in favor of
protection began to lose strength. The young industries
argument at the same time began to be less steadily pressed
About 1840 the protective controversy took a new turn. It
seems to have been felt by this time that manufactures
had ceased to be young industries, and that the argument
17
for their protection as such was no longer valid.
17. Tariff History of the United States , by P. . Taussig
eighth edition, G. P. Putnam's & Sons , New York and London,
The Knickerbocker Press, 1931, Page 65.
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The argument then shifted from infant-Industry
protection to protection of American labor from that of
less highly paid foreign labor. The economic situation
had chan,jed and so the discussion of tariff changed
correspondingly
.
The tariff act of 1832 was distinctly a pro-
tective measure with high duties levied on cotton and
woolen goods, iron, and other articles to which pro-
tection was meant to be given. On articles not produced
in the United States, either low duties were imposed, or
none at all.
In 1833, the Compromise Tariff Act was passed,
and remained in effect until 1842. The compromise pro-
vided for protection, to a considerable degree, for nine
years, and then a rapid reduction to a uniform 20 per
cent rate. In 1832 was the starting point for the lowering
of duties. All duties which in that tariff exceeded 20
per cent were to have one-tenth of the excess over 20 per
cent taken off in January 1, 1834; one-tenth more on Jan-
uary 1, 1836; again one-tenth in 1838; and another in 1840.
By 1840 four tenths of the excess over 20 per cent would
18be gone. On January 1, 1842, the other half was to go.
Considered as a political measure, the act of
1833 may have been valuable, but as an economic or finan-
18. Tariff History of the United States
,
by F. W. Taussig,
eighth edition, 3. P. Putnam's & Sons , iJew York and London,
The Knickerbocker Press, 1931, Pages ilO-ill.
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cial measure, it was not too well drafted.
The 20 per cent duty was effective for only
two months for, at that time, September 1, 1842, the
tariff act of 1842 went into effect. It was a hastily
drafted measure, with little thought placed on the pro-
visions; the duties were high. This tariff was felt to
be distinctly a political issue.
It was followed by another political measure,
the tariff of 1846. The act established several schedules
listing the percentage of duties to be applied to articles
appearing on them. These percentages effected a reduction
in duties levied and in some cases put articles on the
free list.
Still further reductions were made in the tariff
of 1857, which supplanted the act of 1846. The revenue
was excessive in 1857, and this was the major reason for
the reduction of duties. The act was passed with little
opposition and was the first act since 1816 which was not
affected by politics. The outline of the act of 1816 was
kept with reduction of duties made on the various schedule
For the period, then, from 1830-1860, we had
the following tariffs: in 1832, a high protective tariff;
then a gradual reduction of duties, ending in 1842 with
a short period of very low duties. Prom 1846 began what
some called a period of free trade, but in reality it was
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one of moderated protection. In 1857, protection was
19
still moderated.
There are some who attribute prosperity to the
protective tariffs of 1842—and depression to the tariffs
of 1833 and 1857. However, the cause for the depressions
may be traced to things other than trade, e.g. specula-
tion, over-banking, and panic. However it is generally
concluded that the period from 1846 to 1860 was a time
of material prosperity, interrupted, but not checked by
the crisis of 1857.
This crisis, however, caused the revenue from
duties to decrease and resulted in a reaction from lower
duties to higher ones. This feeling was culminated in
the Morrill Tariff Act of 1861, which began a change
toward higher duties and increased protectionism. This
tariff proposed a change from ad valorem duties to
specific duties, specific duties being in many cases
higher than the ad valorem rates.
The Morrill Act had scarcely been passed when
the Civil War began. Because of the need of additional
revenue to finance the war, duties were raised. In 1862
an internal revenue act was passed imposing specific
taxes on production of iron and steel, coal-oil, paper,
19. Tariff History of the United States
,
by F. W. Taussig,
eighth edition, G. P. Putnam's & Sons, New York and London,
The Knickerbocker Press, 1931, Page 115.
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leather and other articles. Ad valorem duties were im-
posed on other manufactures.
In 1862, also, was passed a tariff act, which
was to Increase duties to the point where they might
offset the internal taxes Imposed. Because of the in-
ternal conditions in the country, and the need for money,
this bill was passed very easily by Congress, and pro-
tectionism won its point.
The tariff act of 1864, passed at the same time
as the internal revenue act, brought about a great increase
in the rates of taxation. Its object, again was said to
be to put domestic producers in the ssime situation, so
far as foreign competition was concerned, as if the in-
ternal taxes had not been raised. The need for finances
was so great and so unlimited that those who drafted the
tariff act had neither the time nor disposition to inquire
critically into the meaning and effect of the proposed
schedule of rates.
Three forces were at work in 1864 which resulted
in this tariff: (1) the urgent need of revenue for the
war; (2) the wish to offset internal taxes imposed on
domestic producers; and (3) the protectionist leanings
of those in power. These forces led to a tariff act which
in ordinary times would have been summarily rejected.
The identical duties fixed in 1864 remained for
a series of years until 1883, at which time a general re-
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vision was made. The duties had become so much a part
of the national policy, that the public thought of them
as perriianent rather than as war legislation measures.
After the crisis of 1873, the tariff question
died down a bit. The act of 1872 had brought about a
ten per cent reduction because of the excess revenue; its
abolition in 1875 was excused by the falling off in the
government income
.
In 1882, Congress passed an act authorizing the
appointment of a Tariff Commission. The majority of those
appointed were advocates of high protection. 3y this act,
passed 1883, the duties on certain classes of woolen
goods were raised; on most woolens the figures were
lowered. With cotton goods, duties were lowered on com-
mon grades of goods, but on those where the duty was con-
siderable the duties were raised.
This act of 1883 is described as a half-hearted
attempt on the part of those wishing to maintain a sys-
tem of high protection, to make some concession to a
20
public demand for a moderate tariff system. No consist-
ent policy was followed; some duties were increased, some
were lowered.
Within a few years in the act of 1890, duties
were raised still higher and protectionism gained more
20. Tariff History of the United States
,
by F . W. Taussig
eighth edition, G. P. Putnam's & Sons , New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press, l931. Page 231.
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ground. The act was called the McKinley Act and was
the great development of the method of minimum duties.
This method of grading the duties was applied not only
to woolen cloths, dress goods, cotton stockings, velvets,
and plushes, but also to blankets and flannels, boiler
and plate iron, penknives and table-knives, shotguns and
pistols. On some of these articles the minimum system
had already been adopted in earlier acts. The object
apparently was to avoid an ad valorem duty, and yet to
secure an adaptation of the rate of duty to the value
of the article.
As a vdiole the tariff act of 1890, clearly pre-
sented to the people of the United States the question
whether they wished a large extension of the protective
system beyond the point to which it had developed by the
legislation of the war period.
In 1892 the Democrats came into control of the
lower House of Congress and won besides the Presidency.
This gave the Democrats an opportunity to draft a tariff
bill along the lines they had advocated. As a result, the
Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 was drawn up and passed. It was
called a second "tariff of abominations"; it was neither
free-trade or protectionist, but catered to "special in-
terests". President Cleveland refused to sign the bill
and it was passed over his veto. Many people felt that
the threat of this tariff was responsible for the panic
of 1893. At the next election McKinley was elected

41
president and promised to support a revision of the
tariff upward.
In 1897, the Dingley Tariff act was passed,
which had rates even higher than those of the McKinley
Act. Prosperity followed this act and for awhile it
received popular acclaim. The resulting high prices of
commodities caused the Republican leaders themselves to
propose a reduction in tariff rates.
The Payne-Aldrich tariff was passed in 1909,
reducing rates somewhat. President Taft's idea regarding
protective tariffs diverged from the protection of infant
industry, to an equalization of cost of production in the
United States and elsewhere in order to maintain the
21living conditions of American labor.
In 1914, the Underwood-Simmons tariff act was
passed by Congress and signed by the President. It
lowered many rates and enlarged the free list. To offset
any loss in revenue from duties, an income tax was imposed.
In 1922, the Fordney-McCumber tariff was passed
and put into effect by the Republicans. It was highly
protective both in its purpose and its rates. In 1916
an attempt to take tariff out of partisan differences was
made by the appointment of a permanent tariff commission
whose duty would be to study the problem and make recom-
21. Digest of Economics
,
by Thomas J. Lovely, published
by Globe Book Company, ±933, Page 237.
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mendations to Congress. The tariff act of 1922 gave the
President power to alter rates in order to adjust the
tariff to changing conditions. Different rates were as-
signed to different schedules the highest rates "being
on sugar and molasses and the manufactures thereof. The
next highest rate was on tobacco, then silk and silk
goods; the lowest rate on flax, hemp, and the manufac-
tures from them.
These rates assigned were considered extremely
high and brought forth much protest.
However, in 1930, the Hawley-Smoot tariff came
into being and fairly smothered trade by the prohibitive
height of the duties assigned. The act was drafted in
1929 when there was no need for added revenue and appar-
ently no need for protection of home industries; nor was
there any political argument concerning it
.
Its basis is attributed to the agricultural
interests demanding protection for their products. There
was much haranguing over the Act, and it was finally
passed more or less in the spirit of "getting through
with it."
Effect of All through the tariff legislation the
Legislation
duties on sugar came to the fore, and
they appeared as usual in the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. The
rate was fixed at 1.76 cents per pound in 1922, and
eventually came to rest at 210 cents in this Act. This
was set because of the agitation for protection by the
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sugar beet growers. Recovery from the post-war collapse
had been slow; foreign and domestic producers alike had
to face low prices. However, there was no suggestion
that the difference between the two in cost and price
had changed.
Regarded as a whole, the act of 1930 was futile.
The new duties on manufactured goods were mostly of a
petty sort; and agriculture eventually had to be given
government aid. The high duties caused retaliatory
measures to be taken against the United States, and with
nations fighting back high duties with higher duties,
trade became strangled and relationships between nations
strained.
After four years of this disastrous state, the
Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934.
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CHAPTER V
"NEW DEAL " TRADE AGREEMENTS
Our domestic recovery can be neither complete
nor durable unless our surplus-creating branches of
production regain at least a substantial portion of
their lost foreign markets. Our production of cotton,
lard, tobacco, fruits, copper, petroleum products, auto-
mobiles, machinery, electrical and office appliances is
geared to a scale of operations, the output of which ex-
ceeds domestic consumption by 50 per cent.
Trade Agree- The reciprocal trade method of bargain-
ments Act
Passed ing affords us an opportunity to obtain
in each country the relaxation of restrictions with re-
spect to those of our export commodities, the sale of
which in that coimtry's markets is either of special
importance to us or else has been particularly hard hit
by recently published restrictions. It was in order to
make possible the obtaining of such concessions for our
export trade by negotiation with other countries that
Congress empowered the President, for a three-year period,
to conclude reciprocal agreements and, in connection with
such agreements, to modify, within strictly defined
limits, customs, duties and other import restrictions
operative in the United States.
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The second primary need In the field of for-
eign trade is the freeing and safeguarding of our export
trade from adverse discriminations by foreign nations.
Recognition of international cooperation in
trade is given hy the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
This substitutes for unilateral action, in respect to
our foreign trade policy, bilateral negotiation of trade
agreements, with generalization of benefits to all coun-
.
tries not subject to penalties for discrimination against
our trade. This conforms to the multilateral idea in
trade by which all countries are reminded of their de-
pendence upon world trade. One of the principles under-
lying the act is the equality of treatment for all
countries
.
By these means the United States proclaims to
the world that, vihile her economy necessitates adequate
and reasonable protection against the products of cheap
labor, freer exchange of goods and services is essential
to the prosperity of every nation.
This Reciprocal Trade Agreement, adopted in
June 1934, resulted because the administration, under
the leadership of Secretary of State Hull, felt there
was a vital need for the removal of world trade barriers
in general, for a lowering of tariff walls and for a
freer international market in which the manufactures and
products of the United States might have a fair and equal
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chance, rather than to try to exact preferential con-
22
cessions in our exclusive favor.
The chief basic principles of the agreement are:
(1) The delegation of authority by Congress to the Presi-
dent to lower tariff duties by not more than 50 per cent
of the present rate; (2) Adherence to the most-favored-
nation policy; (3) Generalization of concessions to
other countries which do not discriminate against our
commerce; and (4) Limitation of concessions insofar as
possible, to commodities and articles for which the ne-
gotiating country is the principal or primary source of
supply.
There have been many questions arising because
of the generalization of concessions granted in a given
agreement to other countries with which we have not yet
entered into negotiations. This is a rather difficult
technical point, based upon our most-favored-nation policy,
as against exclusive bilateral bargaining.
To use a concrete example, we might look at our
agreement, recently signed, with France. We agreed to a
reduction of our tariff rates on champagne. We are now
obligated to extend a similar concession to all other
countries with which we have most-favored-nation trade
relations. By trying to limit such concessions to pro-
22, Nation' s Business , June 1936, Pg. 49-50, article by
Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, "Reopening Channels of
Trade"
.
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\ANNOUNCEMENTS UNDER THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEI^IENTS
TRADE AGREEIvlENTS CONCLUDED
Country Date Signed Date Effective
Cuba Aug. 24, 1934 Sept 3, 1934
Brazil Feb. 2, 1935 Jan
.
1, 1936
Belgium Feb. 27, 1935 May 1, 1935
Haiti Mar. 28, 1935 June 3, 1935
Sweden May 25, 1935 Aug. 5, 1935
Colombia Sept 13, 1935 May 20, 1936
Canada Nov. 15, 1935 Jan 1, 1936
Honduras Dec
.
18, 1935 Mar. 2, 1936
Kingdom of Netherlands Dec 20, 1935 Feb. 1, 1936
Switzerland Jan 9, 1936 Feb. 15, 1936
Nicaragua Mar. 11, 1936 Oct 1, 1936
Guatemala Apr. 24, 1936 June 15, 1936
Grance and its colonies May 6, 1936 J\me 15, 1936
Finland May 18, 1936 Nov. 2, 1936
Costa Rica Feb. 19, 1937 Aug. 2, 1937
El Salvador Feb. 19, 1937 May 31, 1937
COUNTRIES WITH WHICH INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE
HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED
Date for Date for
Issuance of notice written statement oral statement
Ecudor Apr. 5, 1937 May 3, 1937 May 17, 1937
PRELIMINARY AN:;OUNCEMENT THAT NEGOTIATION OF
A TRADE AGREEMENT IB"~CUNTEMPLATED
Date for
Date of submitting
Preliminary Announcement suggestions
Czechoslovakia May 6, 1937 June 6 , 1937
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ducts for which the foreign country is the most important
producer or source os supply, we prevent outside countries
from reaping undue advantages.
We need to remember that this arrangement works
In our favor also, ^f a foreign nation with which we have
concluded aji agreement based on most -favored-nation treat-
ment grants a concession to a third nation, we are like-
wise entitled to that concession. The whole process thus
makes for the general liberalization of trade relations
and the removal of the restrictions which have caused
such a shrinkage in the vlume of commerce throughout the
entire world.
To date we have signed agreements with sixteen
nations under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. (See
23
opposite page for schedule.)
These agreements which have been concluded have
not been reached without much work and thought on the
part of our statesmen--and suggestions from interested
parties. Too often those of us who are on the sidelines
are apt to suppose that trade agreements are reached in
a very short time, not knowing of the careful study and
planning, adding to and taking out of provisions, and
the final wording which is acceptable to the contracting
parties.
23. Commerce Report
,
August 7, 1937, "Annomcement un-
der the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act".
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Procedure It would be well at this point, I think,
before
Negotiation for us to look back at the mechanics of
the whole procedure leading up to the drafting of the Recip-
rocal Trade Agreements of 1934.
The organization established for carrying out
the trade agreements program and the procedure followed
in the preparation for, and negotiation of, such agreements
are designed to insure the compilation of all pertinent
data, the consideration of all significant factors, the
full availability of expert advice, and the receipt of
the views of business with respect to proposed trade
agreement negotiations. The objectives entail a vast
amount of work. An appreciation of the organization and
procedure set up for handling it requires some knowledge
24
of the scope and nature of the problems involved.
^ Some of the problems involved are: export
problems, "important source" rule. Government revenues,
25
and tariff adjustments.
Research Studies need to be made not only of the
for facts
domestic market but also of the com-
petitive conditions in world markets. It is necessary to con-
sider the probable effects on American industry and trade
of changes not only in the American tariff, but also in
24. Government Publication, Foreign Trade Agreements :
Problems, Organization, Procedure and Work Involved, Pg. 2.
25. Ibid. Pg. 4.
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the tariffs and import restrictions of foreign countries.
Consideration is given to the needs of those industries
vihose market is wholly national, and also to the American
industries who are dependent for existence on world mar-
kets. These are the export industries which have always
been of outstanding importance in American economy and
with Y^ich the economic welfare of a large part of Amer-
ican labor, agriculture and industry is linked, but whose
interests with respect to tariff matters have in the past
received little attention.
In working with export problems, there is re-
quired a knowledge of foreign commercial policies and
practices and of the economic conditions abroad which
produced them. Special consideration must be given to
various devices used extensively by certain foreign
countries to restrict imports, namely, quotas, exchange
control, official monopolies, clearing and compensation
arrangements, and import licenses, to the treatment
accorded American commerce in this operation of such im-
port restrictions; and to international relations which
are now being modified by the negotiation of new coramer-
cail pacts between foreign countries. Another important
factor involved in American export problems is the exist-
ence of American branch plants and factories in foreign
countries and the allocation of production between the
domestic and the foreign units.
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Even though the commodities included in a trade
agreement may be relatively few in number, the work in-
volved before arriving at these few is tremendous. Vir-
tually every item exchanged between the country concerned
and the United States must be examined. Of the hundreds
considered, many have to be discarded because the country
is not the chief, or an important, source of the importa-
tions. Since the Trade Agreements Act requires that re-
ductions in United States duties made pursuant to a trade
agreement be generalized to all countries not discrimin-
ating against American commerce, it is important to know
what percentage of our imports of any commodity on which
a concession is requested is supplied by the foreign
country with which the trade agreement is being negotiated.
If the country concerned is not the principal supplier,
it generally follows that a concession on the product in
question will be of greater value if it is reserved for
tariff bargaining with a country which i_s the important
source.
Despite the diversity of foreign sources of
many important products, our trade with each foreign coun-
try usually contains many articles or classes of articles
of which the other country is the chief or important
source. In the case of all the important trading nations
of the world, therefore, there exists a more or less broad
basis for tariff bargaining.
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The effects of tariff reductions on government
revenues constitute another problem for consideration.
In the case of certain imported commodities for which the
domestic demand is relatively Inelastic and on which the
existing duty is especially productive of government
revenues, the loss in revenues that would result from a
reduction in the duty might be out of proportion to any
increase in trade which might be expected as a result of
a reduction of the duty.
By means of a reasonable adjustment in our
tariff, foreign countries may be induced to reduce their
barriers against the products of American agriculture and
industry. Thus , a net gain for American business as a
whole, which will mean increased employment and a higher
standard of living, may be achieved. A corresponding
gain is likewise possible for the foreign countries which
cooperate in the reciprocal reductions of trade restric-
tions •v\hich have throttled international trade.
The trade agreements program is based upon the
principle that trade is of mutual advantage. This in-
volves an extraordinary amount of fact finding, study and
analysis in order to carry out the Trade Agreements Act.
The extent of any proposed reduction of duty, within 50
per cent limit imposed by the Act, must be considered in
relation to the needs of American agriculture and industry
and must also depend upon the advantages to American ex-
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port trade to be derived from the reciprocal reductions
in trade "barriers.
These problems which have been cited give us a
little insight into the careful research done to satisfy
the interests of the whole nation, rather than those of
special or local groups. This means that American economy
must be studied in perspective, be examined in its inter-
national aspects, and be analyzed in its particulars with
reference to individual commodities and to the special
problems of agriculture and labor. Because of the many
angles to be considered, the program is dependent upon the
cooperation of many departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment and also upon the cooperation of business.
Committee on The work of the trade agreements pro-
Trade Agreements
gram centers around the departmental
Committee on Trade Agreements on which are represented
the Departments of State, Commerce and Agriculture, the
Treasury Department, the Tariff Commission, the Office
of the Special Adviser to the President on Foreign Trade,
and the National Recovery Administration. Broad questions
of commercial policy are referred by this committee to the
Interdepartmental Executive Committee on Commercial Policy.
The Committee for Reciprocity Information was established
for the purpose of providing business a convenient channel
through which to bring its views in regard to proposed a-
greements to the attention of the trade agreements organi-
zation. There has been set up in the Department of State
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a special division knom as the Division of Trade Agree-
ments, for the piirpose of administering the program and
coordinating the activities of the various governmental
agencies participating in the trade agreements work.
The Committee on Trade Agreements is the nu-
cleus of the interdepartmental trade agreements organi-
zation. It considers all matters of policy, reviews
each proposed agreement and examines in detail the con-
cessions recommended for inclusion in the schedule.
This committee at present has twenty-eight interdepart-
mental sub-committees grouped under these headings:
Coimtry Coriimittees
,
Commodity Corrjmittees and Special
Committees. The members of these subcommittees con-
stitute a personnel consisting of almost one himdred
officers, economists, and experts of the government.
Country For each country or group of countries
Committees
with which it is proposed to enter into
trade agreement negotiations, a country committee is es-
tablished to formulate for the consideration of the
Committee on Trade Agreements the schedules of conces-
sions to be requested and concessions which might be
granted, ^t is the Country Committee's duty to assemble
and analyze all available pertinent data from both offi-
cial and private sources, including the information and
views submitted by interested persons to the Committee
for Reciprocity Information. The schedule of concessions
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to be requested Is based upon the data and recommenda-
tions submitted to the Country Committee by the experts
of the Department of Commerce; the schedule of conces-
sions which might be granted is based upon the data and
recommednat ions of the experts of the Tariff Commission.
The proposals of these experts are carefully examined
and may be rejected, modified, or added to as the result
of further information and technical opinion sp-pplied by
the representatives on the Country Committee of other
units of the Government, such as, the Departments of
State and Agriculture and the Treasury Department.
The recommendations of the Coimtry Committee
are submitted to the Committee on Trade Agreements in
the form of a report consisting usually of several vol-
umes. There are contained therein the reasons for each
recommendation made and the supporting data. The report,
as finally amended and approved by the Committee on Trade
Agreements, is then submitted to the President for tenta-
tive approval before active negotiations with representa-
tives of the foreign country concerned. Questions arising
in the course of negotiations may be referred to the pro-
per Country Committee for consideration and recommenda-
tions, and members of such committees may be called upon
to sit in on the negotiations to advise the American
representatives
.
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Other Sub- The Commodity Comnilttees are estab-
coinmlttees
lished to study special problems in-
volved in trade negotiations with respect to a class or
group of commodities. Their studies are made available
to country committees for use in the preparation of ten-
tative schedules.
The Special Committees are established to study
particular problems involved in trade negotiations with
respect to matters involving questions of general policy,
such as quotas, exchange control, and discriminations
against American commerce.
The personnel of the commodity and special com-
mittees includes in a number of Instances experts of de-
partments or agencies of the Government other than those
participating actively in the program. This is in ac-
cordance with the aim of the trade agreements organiza-
tion to obtain with reference to any problem at hand the
most complete information and the best technical advice
available
.
Committee for The purpose of the Committee for Reci-
Reciprocity
Information procity Information is to afford busi-
ness a full opportunity to male known its views with re-
spect to proposed trade agreement negotiations. Business
interests are invited to submit to this Committee written
statements of their views regarding the trade negotiations
with countries concerning which a public announcement has
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been made. Persons who have submitted written statements
but who desire to present further views orally, may make
application to do so. The hearings before the Committee
may be attended by anyone who desires to attend them.
The regulations of the Committee for Reciproc-
ity Information governing the form and manner of pre-
senting views appear regularly in Commerce Reports of
the Department of Commerce and in Press Releases of the
Department of State and are contained in the July 12 and
September 6, 1934, numbers of Treasury Decisions of the
Treasury Department.
Intention to The public notices of intention to ne-
Negotiate
gotlate a trade agreement are published
officially from time to time In the three weekly periodi-
cals named above. In order that interested persons may
have anple opportunity to present their views, a period
of at least six or seven weeks following the date of the
public notice of intention to negotiate a trade agreement
is usually allowed for submitting written statements to
the Committee. Oral statements are usually received about
one week later.
At the time public notice is given of intention
to negotiate a trade agreement, the general nature of the
trade between the United States and the country concerned
is indicated by tables of statistics in regard to the
principal commodities entering into the trade. Additional
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statistical Information in regard to any article of im-
port or export may be obtained upon request from the
Division of Foreign Trade Statistics or the District
Offices of the Department of Commerce. Other informa-
tion in regard to trade or tariff matters may be ob-
tained from the Department of Commerce or the Tariff
Commission. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume
that American producers, importers, exporters, and other
interested persons would know whether the country with
which a trade agreement is to be negotiated is of any
consequence as a source of supply, or as a market for
the product or products in which they are interested, and
that they would know also the factors affecting the trade
in such products. As in the case of tariff revision in
the past, such persons are given an opportunity to make
their views known.
All information received either orally or in
writing by the Committee for Reciprocity Information is
referred promptly to the appropriate Country Committee
for careful consideration. Every pertinent suggestion
or fact submitted with respect to either the import or
the export trade receives full consideration along with
the information available from governmental sources.
The Committee for Reciprocity Information
greatly facilitates the work in connection with the trade
agreements program. It supplies to the Country Committee
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in an organized and digested fom the sort of information
which formerly was obtained "by means of congressional
hearings and, at the same time, relieves the Coumtry
Committee from the pressure of personal contact by inter-
ests seeking special favors. This system therefore per-
mits to a far greater extent than has been possible in
the past a scientific treatment of tariff problems.
The details connected with treaty negotiations
are necessarily numerous, almost endless it seems, but
the data needed is so great, and its interpretation so
vital, that adequate time and energy must be given to
them. These agreements, lAhen consummated are binding on
the contracting countries until due notice is given of
termination dates. Therefore the utmost care must be
taken that they include exactly what they were set up to
accomplish.
These agreements are the work of statesmen who
have had years of experience behind them linked with ex-
perts who have been gathered together from various fields.
These statesmen have worked toward this end because they
feel that unless we can export and sell abroad our sur-
plus production, we must face a violent dislocation of
our whole domestic economy.
Our national economy has been geared to support
millions of workers in occupations which have come to be
vitally dependent upon foreign markets.

59
The American trade agreement program seeks the
protection of American agriculture and industrial inter-
ests by the liberalization of world trades. That is why
the program is of extreme consequence, not only to the
United States but to other nations as well. What matters
is not selfish trade advantages gained by individual
nations over their competitors, but the gradual liberal-
ization of world trade through the adopting similar pro-
26grams by other nations.
26. Taken from address given by Francis B. Sayre,
Assistant Secretary of State, before the World Trade
Conference, Detroit, Michigan, %rch 10, 1936, "Trade
Policies and Peace".
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CHAPTER VI
SPECIFIC TRADE AGREEI;1ENTS
All of the agreements allov/ very valuable con-
cessions and are steps forward in this progressive trade
program we have initiated. There are some agreements
which we feel are particularly momentous, and those we
will comment on briefly here.
Agreement with Of particular interest to the country is
Canada
the agreement with Canada, signed Novem-
ber 1935 and effective January 1, 1936. It is of major
concern, not alone because of the advantages in trade
which obtain to both Canada and the United States, but
because of Canada's relationship to Great Britain.
It is felt that the Canadian Agreement is an
opening wedge for the inclusion of the United Kingdom smd
the whole empire in the circle of nations that are to
follow the United States out of high protectionism just
27
as they followed it into such a situation.
Under the most-favored-nation clause, which is
the foundation of the studied policy of world generali-
zation of each particular agreement, all the concessions
given to Canada extend equally to the whole British Em-
27. Taken from an address by W. E. Dunn, Assistant Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, De-
partment of Commerce, before a dinner given by the Foreign
Trade Club of Baltimore, in Baltimore, Md., May 19, 1936.
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plre except as its tariff and trade laws may discrimin-
ate against the United States. But section 338 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 makes every port of the British Em-
pire which maintains its own separate tariff rates or
regulations of commerce an independent nation for the
purpose of the Act, which means from the American point
of view, that in these reciprocal agreement negotiations
all special concessions within the British Empire are in
principle discrimination against the United States. In
turn, that potentially means no automatic favors for
them and that even a 50 per cent punitive duty can be
imposed by Presidential proclamation upon all those self'
governing ports of the British Empire which are included
in the Ottawa Imperial Conference preferential tariff
agreements
.
The signing of the agreement with Canada in
November 1935 was considered a major accomplishment be-
cause of the innate protectionism of the politically
dominsint Canadian east, and of the eastern industrial
and midwestern agricultural interests in the United
States and the strength of special interests in each
country, which resulted in a reversal of the trend of
recent years. In this agreement, Canada lowered the
tariff on all items a little. The United States con-
cessions were more substantial, but on a limited num-
ber of special and selected products.
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Canadian-American Trade Relations background
was uniquely favorable to any kind of treaty. Its total
trade, even at its lowest point, was considerably larger
than between any other tvit) countries; United States in-
vestments in Canada, which are paying current interest
are more than the total United States foreign investments
paying interest in the rest of the world; while Canadian
investments in the United States are proportionally even
larger, and make Canada one of the half-dozen largest
capital lenders in the world.
Roughly, one fourth of Canadian manufacturing
industry is owned and controlled by the parent company
across the border. The United States tariff policy is
to protect labor on the farm and in the factory. No
product which is largely the result of labor is permitted
entrance. On the other hand it is certainly the United
States industrial policy, and to some extent the tariff
policy, to secure industrial raw materials that are the
product of favored natural resources, as cheaply as
possible. The implications of the policy are unfavorable
to Europe and Japan, but not to Canada.
The United States made concessions, limited by
quotas, on some agricultural products, lumber, fish. A
number of other items were guaranteed against a change of
duty and consisted largely of other electro-products now
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on the free list, such as pulp, newsprint, cyanide,
sodium cyanide, and various metals.
The specific Csmadlan reductions were princi-
pally on oranges and other fruits and vegetables, farm
implements, machinery and other iron and steel items,
A more general change was the application of the inter-
mediate tariff rates chiefly affecting textiles, auto-
mobiles, and automobile parts, and petrol.
It is evident that economics and politics were
skillfully combined. The guarantees against tariff in-
crease on a number of products that were actively
threatened, and the tariff reductions by the United States
on electro-products (which will be of chief direct advan-
tages to a relatively small number of manufacturers in
both countries), together with the Canadian reductions in
iron and steel, are most encouraging steps toward contin-
ental rationalization.
In fact, perhaps the most significant criticism
of the treaty is that it has been greeted for the most
part, with relief rather than with opposition by the
vested protective interests on both sides of the border.
The direct concessions extended by Canada to
the United States under the agreement fall into four
general groups:
28. Analysis of Canadian-American Trade during the first
year under the Reciprocal Agreement, May 28, 1937, De-
partment of State.

64
1. Direct reductions on a large list of
specified items;
2. Assurance to the United States on all
other coimiioditi es of treatment as favorable as that ac-
corded to any non-British country, thus bringing duties
on all American exports to Canada down from the "general"
to the "Intermediate" or a still lower level in the
Canadian three-column tariff;
3. Relief from arbitrary valuations that had
been supplied to rr.any commodities; and
4. Benefits to comjnercial travelers and transit
trade passing through the United States, as well as exemp-
tion from duty of purchases of Canadian travelers in the
29United States up to f;100.
Agreement with Another agreement of importance in our
France
step toward reciprocal trade relation-
ships is that which wo.s signed by the United States and
France at Washington on May 5, 1936. It is felt that this
agreement will go far to restore mutually advantageous
trade relations between the two countries. This was the
13th agreement included by the United States under the
Act of 1934, and the fifth made with a European coujitry.
It is the first comprehensive trade agreement made with
France in over a century and constitutes a landmark in
29. Reciprocity—A National Policy for Foreign Trade,
by William. S. Culbertson, published by McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., Whittlesey House, 1937, Page 77.
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Franco-American commercial relations. The provisions
became effective on June 15, 1936,
By this agreement the United States is assured
that, with few unimportant exceptions, it will enjoy the
most favorable tariff treatment which France now or here-
after accords to any country, thus removing the discrim-
ination against the United States which has heretofore
existed with respect to a large number of commodities.
The duty reductions resulting from this provision, to-
gether with special duty reductions expressly provided
in the agreement, the continuance of present tariff rates
on other commodities, and provisions Increasing the quotas
admissible from the United States, result in advantages
affecting over one-fourth of the total imports from the
United States to Prance. The proportion of dutiable im-
ports benefited is much higner, since nearly half of the
American products entering France are, and long have been,
free of duty, since they are in the nature of materials
required by French industry. In return the United States
has reduced duties, or bound the continuance of the present
rates, on articles representing about one-third of the
total imports from Fraiice into this country. On the Basis
of 1935 trades, the benefits affect American export pro-
30
ducts to a value of 24.5 million dollars.
30. Trade Agreem.ent Between the United States and France,
signed May 6, 1936, Analysis of the General Provisions and
Reciprocal Concess"ons, I5epartment of State.
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Before the enactment of the Trade Agreements
Act of June 12, 1934, attempts to work out a satisfactory-
basis for trade between the tv/o countries had proved
futile. Therefore this trade agreement with France is
doubly important, not only because of the direct advan-
tages vjhich American trade receives from the tariff con-
cessions which the United States obtained under the agree-
ment but also because it provides an example of the ef-
fectiveness of the reciprocal trade as a means of securing
the removal of restrictions and discriminations against
31United States foreign trade.
Following the war, and in the early years of
depression, our exports to France were subjected to an
excessive number of trade restrictions and discrimina-
tions. As a result of these and other factors American
exports to France dropped from |265,000,000 in 1929 to
^111,000,000 in 1932, or by nearly 60 per cent.
Among the American products on which France
gave important tariff concessions are: grapefruit and
canned pineapples (unsweetened), dried prunes, raisins;
and certain automobile parts and accessories, spark
plugs; sewing machine heads, cash registers, and foun-
tain pens; motion picture films and vulcanized rubber.
31. Reciprocity—A National Policy for Foreign Trade,
by William S. Culbertson, published by McGraw-Hill Book '
Company, Inc., Whittlesey House, 1937, Page 78.
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In addition to these items United States ex-
ports benefits under the most-favored-nation clause from
reductions in duties on hundreds of products, of which
the following are among the most important: whole (milled)
rice; refrigerating apparatus and a number of other types
of machinery; tires and tubes and various other rubber
manufactures; paraffin wax; certain kinds of paper, and
wall board and insulating board.
Under the quota provisions of the agreement
the United States received increased allocations for an
important group of commodities, of which the chief ones
are: fresh apples and pears, canned salmon, logs and
lumber, silk hosiery, passenger automobiles and automo-
bile bodies, agricultural machinery and tractors, radios
and radio tubes, electrical household refrigerators and
refrigerating apparatus, and typewriters and certain
tools.
A summary of the concessions made by France
follows
:
1. Reduction in 19 rates of duty affecting
products of which the imports into France from the United
States in 1935 were valued at about 53,500,000 francs
(about |3, 560, 000); some of these reductions are of only
nominal percentage and serve mainly to assure trade sta-
bility;
32. Reciprocity—A National Policy for Foreign Trade,
by William S. Culbertson, published by McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., \Vhittlesey House, 1937, Page 79.
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2. Continuance of the existing rates of duty
on a number of articles on practically all of which the
United States already enjoyed the minimum rates of the
French tariff, the value of the imports of these articles
in 1935 being about 77,100,000 francs (about ^5,140,000) ;
5. Auto concessions on 44 products, either in
the form of supplementary quotas or of definite alloca-
tions to the United States where no separate allocation
had been given before; the value of French imports of
these products from the United States in 1935 was
205,900,000 francs (about ;^13,730,000) ;
4. Assurance with regard to the purchase of
American leaf tobacco by the French Tobacco Monopoly for
the 1936 season; the value of the import of this article
in 1935 was 37,400,000 francs (about $2,490,000);
5. Assurance that the treatment of American
motion picture films for exhibition in Prance v/ill be
no less favorable than at present.
In addition to the advantages thus secured to
the United States on specified commodities, its General
Provisions are of major importance. Hereafter, with very
minor exceptions listed in the agreement itself, American
products exported to France or to its Colonies and Posses-
sions will enjoy the benefit of the most favorable tariff
treatment accorded any country. As a result, many American
commodities, heretofore paying the maximum or intermediate
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rates of the French tariff will hereafter enjoy the
minimum rates; the value of the trade affected by this
change on the basis of 1934 statistics, was about
90,000,000 francs (about §6,000,000). This figure
imderstates the importance of the concession because the
discrimination itself operated to curtail the American
share in French imports of these commodities.
Summary of Con- Concessions granted to France in the
cessions by the
United States trade agreement involve reductions of
71 items affecting 51 tariff paragraphs of the act of
1930. These items in 1935 accounted for i^ig ,070 ,000
out of $58,333,000, the total imports into the United
States from France in that year. Two items accoimting
for $571,000 additional in trade in 1935 are bound.
From the standpoint of present trade the most important
articles upon which reductions in duty are made by the
agreem.ent are cigarette paper, brandy, champagne, still
wines and vermuth, vanilla beans, lace, tinsel products,
broadsilks, and Roquefort cheese.
As a safeguard against the possible effect of
any exceptionally large change in the relative value of
the currencies upon the measure of protection afforded
by their respective duties, the agreement provides that
if there should be so wide a change in the relative value
of the currencies of the two countries as to prejudice
the industries or commerce of either country, the country
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concerned may propose negotiations for the modification
of the agreement or terminate it In its entirety on thir-
ty days' notice.
Agreement The agreement with Cuba is a special case,
with Cuba
the concessions granted by the United
States and Cuba to each other not being extended to any
other country. The preferential treatment of Cuban trade
by the United States is justified on the ground of special
geographical and historical relationship. In line with
this policy, the United States grants exclusive conces-
sions on Cuban sugar, rum, tobacco, and off-season fruits
and vegetables in return for augmented tariff advantages
for United States agricultural and industrial products
33
n-umbering several himdred items
.
The Cuban-American Trade Agreement has been in
force for two years and the rate of recovery in trade be-
tv/een the two countries has been most pronounced. During
the second full year of the agreement, the value of United
States products sold to Cuba aggregated 64 million dollars,
as compared with 55 million dollars during the depressed
two-year period preceding the agreement. Compared with
that two-year period the rate of increase in the value of
our exports to Cuba was 85 per cent for the first agree-
ment year and 113 per cent for the second.
33. Analysis of Cuban-American Trade during the first
two years under the Reciprocal Agreement, January 19, 1937,
Department of State.
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The value of American imports from Cuba
reached the figure of 151 million dollars during the
first twelve months under the agreement, after an ex-
ceptionally low average value for the two preceding
years of 51 million dollars
.
Pending agree- A treaty with Czechoslovakia is now in
ment with
Czechoslovakia the process of being negotiated. In-
tention to negotiate has been issued, and those persons
and firms interested in the terms thereof are presenting
their views to the proper committee. There has been
much controversy over the reduction of duties on shoes.
The Shoe Manufacturers are much aroused and feel that any
such agreement would sound the death knell of the domestic
production of shoes, on the argument that American manu-
facturers cannot compete with those of Czechoslovakia
because of the higher labor costs in the United States.
The groups have not yet come to any decision concerning
the terms of the agreement.
Proposed agree- Another treaty has been in the process
ment with
Great Britain of formation for the last year, that of
the United Kingdom and the United States. The Imperial
Conference which started on Kay 14, 1937, was felt to hold
the fate of that agreement in its midst . There are those
who feel that the ultimate success of the Administration's
reciprocal trade prograni hinges on this agreement because
it will provide an outlet for farm products if negotiated.
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and probably give the Impetus necessary to complete
34
agreements with the rest of Continental Europe.
Three developments are anticipated; trade
pacts within the empire are expected to be extended on
a bilateral and more liberal basis; Great Britain will
have extensive, if not complete, cooperation of members
of the empire in working out a trade agreement between
this country and each of the dominions; ajid this vast
program of lowering trade barriers will stimulate simi-
lar moves with other countries which will have the bene-
ficial effect on trade that was expected to come out of
the World Economic Conference of 1933.
It was felt that the agreement with Canada,
already consummated, would be an opening wedge in any
future agreement which might be negotiated with the
United Kingdom,
34. Business Week, May 15, 1937, Pages 13-14, "New
world trade deal planned; United Kingdom—United States".
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CHAPTER VII
EVALUATION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM
The third year of negotiations under the
Trade Agreements Act of June 1934, drew to a close, and
efforts were being made to have Congress extend the
authorization to the President for another period. In
order to present forceful reasons for the continuance of
this purpose, adopted during an acute domestic crisis,
it was necessary that some kind of an evaluation of the
program, its scope and results, be made.
General Results It cannot be expected that results could
be overwhelmingly in favor of the agreement objectives.
The program was a new one, promoted by the United States
at a time when nations were in a state of economic dis-
tress. Millions of people throughout the world were ion-
employed and in want. The decline in international trade
had been a major factor both in causing and in aggravating
and prolonging the economic depression. Worldwide econo-
mic dislocation was leading rapidly toward a general break
down in both the internal life and the external relations
of nations. In the United States the grim hand of econom-
ic disaster had reached into every phase of our national
life. This was the situation in which we found ourselves
after a post-war decade of rising trade barriers, climaxed
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in our own country by the passage of the Hawley-Smoot
Act, and abroad by a group of new trade restrictions,
partly in retaliation against the Hawley-Smoot Act,
35
such as the world had never before witnessed.
It was to meet this crisis in o\ir foreign
trade and to head us back gradually in the right direc-
tion that the Trade Agreements Act was passed. Consid-
ering the tremendous difficulties that have had to be
faced, great progress had been made. Trade agreements
with sixteen countries have been concluded; agreements
with Spain and Italy, vdiich had been started have been
suspended until the internal upheavals there warrant
a renewal of negotiations; plans to negotiate an agree-
ment with Czechoslavakia have been announced.
Review of Three significant facts stand out from
Progress
a review of the progress under this
program for negotiating agreements with foreign coun-
tries. First, the United States has been able in this
period to conclude such agreements with sixteen coun-
tries, which together normally accoimt for well over
one-third of our total exports and Imports, Second, the
program has appreciably expanded the volume of total
American foreign trade in both directions. Third, our
trade with those nations with which agreements have been
35. Taken from address given by Lynn R. Edminster, Chief
Economic Analyst, Division of Trade Agreements, Depart-
ment of State, at the Second Institute of International
Problems, sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association,
New York, March 13, 1937, "The Trade Agreements i'rogram
in Retrospect and Prospect".
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concluded has Increased to a greater extent than that
36
with the non-agreement countries.
In the case of most of the agreements which
had been in effect for a sufficient period of time, and
under circumstances which allow a fair Judgment, the
trade of the United States with each has shown a greater
increase than our trade with the world generally. While
varying with regard to individual countries, American
exports to the trade agreement countries as a whole showed
an increase of 14 per cent during 1936 over 1935, while
our sales to non-agreement countries registered only a
4 per cent gain. Similarly, the value of the products
imported from the trade agreements countries rose during
the past year by 22 per cent, as compared with a 16 per
cent increase for the non-trade agreement countries. In
general, with those countries with which agreements were
in effect during the entire calendar year 1936, the trade
showed a more marked gain than in the case of countries
with which agreements were in effect only part of the year.
It is difficult to determine whether the agree-
ments in themselves resulted in a larger expansion in
imports or in exports. In any case, the amount of that
influence was small compared with the broader factors
36. Commerce Report
,
May 15, 1937, Page 385, "Progress
of the reciprocal trade agreements program", by H, Chalmers.

76
affecting the trend of the trade balances of the United'
States and other industrial countries during the past
year
We have made a general statement concerning
the percentage gain in trade due to the trade agreements
negotiated. Very definite progress toward the goal set
by Congress has been achieved.
Let us look for a moment into specific conces-
sions obtained. These concessions have been of benefit
to a wide class of our agricultural and industrial ex-
port products.
One of the serious situations which our farmers
were facing in 1934 was the increasing trend toward
national self-sufficiency in foreign countries and, in
consequence, a growing movement for extreme protection
for agricultural products in countries on which we were
normally dependent for the sale of large quantities of
38
our agricultural surpluses. To our farmers and agri-
cultural Interests, therefore, the trade agreements pro-
gram is a matter of great vital importance. Despite
these policies of agricultural self-sufficiency which are
37. Commerce Report
,
May 15, 1937, Page 383, "Progress of
the reciprocal trade agreements program", by H. Chalmers.
38. Statement made by Francis B. Sayre, Assistant Secre-
tary of State, before the Committee on Ways and Means of
the House of Representatives in the Course of Hearings on
House Joint Resolution No. 96, commencing January 21, 1937,
"The Conditions in 1934 which the Trade Agreements Act V/as
Designed to Remedy."
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extremely difficult to combat, tariff and tax reductions
and liberalization of import quotas have been obtained
with respect to agricultural commodities that comprised
nearly a third of our 1929 agricultural exports to trade
agreement countries. In addition these countries have
bound on their free lists or at existing favorable rates
agricultural products which accounted for almost another
third of our farm exports to them. Moreover, due to our
policy of equal treatment to others we have by means of
general provision secured in return non-discriminatory
application to American trade of remaining restrictions
and have also secured the assurance of any benefits v/hich
may in the future be extended to other coimtries.
Literally hundreds of concessions in one form
or another have been granted to us for our farm products
in contrast to the relatively few and limited concessions
granted by us in favor of foreign agricultural products.
Specific Canada made reductions ranging from 12
Concessions
to 65 per cent on fresh meats, bacon,
ham, lard, cured meats, extracts and other meat products,
and thirteen other countries have granted concessions on
American meat or other animsl products exclusive of fish.
Cuba, which was once the ranking outlet for American lard
reduced its duty from a rate equivalent to 9.8 cents a
pound to 2.3 cents per pound in the first year of the
agreement and agreed to a further gradual reduction to

78
1.5 cents to be reached in the third year. Moreover,
Cuba, as provided for in the agreement, at the end of
the second year, abolished its consumption tax of one
cent per pound on lard.
Concessions of direct benefit to the American
citrus fruit industry had been obtained in 15 of the
39
agreements concluded thus far.
Fourteen of the agreements secure duty re-
ductions, or guarantee not to increase present duties,
on fresh, canned or dried vegetables. In some cases all
duties were removed and certain vegetables placed on the
free list. Canada, in particular, has given this coimtry
far-reaching concessions on vegetables. The duty was
removed entirely from sweet potatoes, eggplants, and
artichokes; the basic ad valorem rates on most other fresh
vegetables were reduced by fifty per cent; and valuable
concessions were obtained in regard to the minimum specif-
ic duties and increased valuations applicable during the
season when our vegetables compete with Canadian vegetables.
Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Guate-
mala have granted concessions on wheat. Canada, Cuba, the
Netherlands and four Central American countries have given
concessions on wheat flour. The United States has re-
ceived substantial concessions from Haiti on butter and
39. Statement made by Francis B. Sayre before the House
during Hearings on House Joint Resolution No. 96, commenc-
ing January 21, 1937, "The Conditions in 1934 which the
Trade Agreements Act was Designed to Remedy."

79
fimd cheese. Six coimtries have agreed to continue their
present favorable treatment of Imports of American raw
cotton; five have granted concessions on cotton yarn, ten
on various cotton textile manufactures; and two countries
have granted concessions on cottonseed cake and oil.
There are also numerous concessions which cover
a wide range of manufactures and semi-manufactures which
are of benefit to Industrial interests. Among important
groups of commodities thus benefited are iron and steel
semi-manufactures, automotive products, electrical ap-
paratus, industrial agriculture and business machinery,
rubber products, paints and allied products, hides and
leather products, and textiles.
An extensive range of concessions have been
obtained on the products of steel rolling mills and steel
fabricating plants, notably in the Canadian, Cuban and
French agreements
.
The rubber Industry benefits not only from the
easing of foreign restrictions on motor vehicles, but
also from the direct concessions on rubber tires or inner
tubes in every agreement except those with Belgium and
Costa Rica.
In order to open up trade routes it is neces-
sary that the granting of concessions be a two-party
agreement. This essential factor seems to be forgotten
or omitted by those who oppose the Trade Agreements pro-
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gram. These Individuals seem perfectly satisfied as long
as we are being granted reductions or concessions, but
they seem not to go that second step and realize that we
must give if we hope to receive.
Naturally then, there are concessions which
have been granted by the United States in return, upon
which we should comment. The United States has granted
moderate tariff reductions; but not a single reduction
has been made except after the fullest and most careful
study of what would be its effects direct and indirect
40
upon domestic industries.
Many of the non-agricultural concessions granted
by the United States are on products used in advanced in-
dustries or in construction and by virtue of their effect
in reducing production costs are of benefit to American
producers and consumers alike.
Concessions granted by this country on agri-
cultural items have been few. i^^any of our agricultural
concessions involve products which are not competitive
with those of our own farms.
The few concessions granted on the remaining
competitive agricultural products were extremely moderate.
In most cases concessions on competitive agricultural
products were accompanied by strict limitations on the
40. Statonent made by Francis B. Sayre before the House
during Hearings on House Joint Resolution No. 96, commenc-
ing January 21, 1937, "The Conditions, in 1934 which the
Trade Agreements Act was Designed to ^^emedy."
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quantity which may be admitted at the lower rates or on
the seasons when reduced rates apply.
Since the initiation of the trade agreements
program, the countries to ^ASiich the United States ex-
tends its concessions (except Germany and Australia) have
granted to one another (and to Germany and Australia) con-
cessions of many sorts affecting many products. In total
these concessions are a vast number, considerably more
than the n-umber of concessions which have been granted by
the United States in the same period under all the trade
agreements. Because the United States, in application of
the unconditional most-favored-natlon policy, extends its
concessions to these countries, these countries in turn
have very generally extended their concessions to the
United States. ^"^
The increases in American imports resulting
from the extension of the trade agreement concessions to
third parties, and in American exports resulting in re-
turn, cannot be measured statistically—there are too many
factors which enter into the consideration. A rough es-
timate, however, may be made by comparing the share of
United States imports affected by the extension of the
trade agreement concessions with the share of United
States exports that would have been subjected to a degree
41. Press Release, June 1937, "Adherence by the United
States to the Unconditional Most-favored-nation Policy in
connection with the Agreements Program."
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of risk approaching certainty of receiving treatment in
foreign markets less favorable than that which it actually
receives, had the United States granted its concessions
as exclusive preferences or on a conditional most-favored-
nation basis
.
The imports into the United States (on the basis
of 1934 figures) which have been affected, in the sense
of being made subject to increase, by the extension of
the trade agreement concessions to third countries amount
to roughly
.fi>30 ,000,000.
The exports of the United States on which are
now levied in the countries of their destination the lower
of two (or more) existing rates of duty applicable to the
respective products concerned amount to roughly ^265,000,000
.
This is the share of our exports (on the basis of 1934
figures) which would almost certainly be deprived of the
favorable treatment which it now enjoys if the United
States attempted to operate trade agreements program on
the basis of some other than the unconditional most-
favored-nation policy.
As in the case of the United States, the rates
applied by other countries lower than their general or
maximum tariffs have generally been established in agree-
ments are generally granted only to imports from countries
which enjoy most-favored-nation treatment. We, who are
proponents of the Trade Agreements program, readily recog-
•T
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nize that trade is beginning to move more freely in
response to reciprocal agreements. However, exact
measurements of increases is difficult at this point
because the agreements have been in effect so short a
time. The only countries with whom agreements have been
in effect long enough for the United States to make an
analysis of results are Canada and Cuba.
It must remembered that exports and imports
are not affected solely by tariff increases or reduc-
tions; there are so many alien factors which are hampering
the movement of trade, e.g. governmental restrictions,
internal economic distress.
The statistics which have been arrived at for
Canada and Cuba are voluminous; but a few instances will
be cited.
Our exports to Cuba increased from ^35, 000, 000
in the year preceding the effective date of the agreement
,
September 3, 1934, to |55,000,000 in the first year of
the agreement, and to -^^64,000,000 in the second year, re-
cording a rate of increase far in excess of that for
42Cuban imports from other countries.
In the first ten months of the trade agreement
with Canada, the United States exports to Canada amounted
42. Statement made by Francis 3. Sayre before the House
during Hearings on House Joint Resolution No. 96, commenc-
ing January 21, 1937, "The Conditions in 1934 which the
Trade Agreements Act was Designed to Remedy.

84
to 1315,000,000 as compared to ?1^274,000 ,000 In the
corresponding period in 1935.
In the industrial field striking increases
occurred in the purchases of American automobiles by
trade agreement countries. In the first six months of
the Canadian agreement, the niimber and value of motor
vehicles imported from the United States more than
doubled in comparison with the same period in 1935,
while the comparable increase in such exports to all
countries was only eight per cent.
During the first six months of 1936 Canadian
imports from the United States of industrial machinery
affected by the Canadian trade agreement increased on
the average by $1,500,000 per month over the same months
of the preceding year. Canadian imports of our agricul-
tural machinery during this period increased from
13,300,000 to $5,500,000 or by 67 per cent.
It would be inadvisable to list consecutively
the increases in each commodity export and import af-
fected by the trade agreements with the various countries.
The instances given are enough to indicate that two-way
trade has been stimulated by the conclusion of trade
agreements
.
Opposition Naturally, there are those who are op-
to Program
posed to the program and who fail to
see that the present results warrant a continuance of
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negotiations. Some of them are sincerely opposed to it;
others quote statistics and cite Instances which illus-
trate their opinions, giving very often only a partial
picture of the situation, or neglecting to explain the
reasons for conditions.
There seems to have been continued opposition
from the farm supporters who decry the increased agri-
cultural imports of the past two or three years. To
just quote increased figures would incite the anger of
those whose sympathies lie with the farmers. But, when
to the figures are added reasons, the picture assumes
a different color. The essential facts concerning in-
creases in agricultural products are these: (1) that
much of the increase in imports in fa.nn products is in
raw materials and foodstuffs which are wholly non-com-
petitive with domestic agriculture and is simply our ac-
companiment of economic recovery; (2) that most of the
remaining increase is in products where severe domestic
shortages developed as a result /Chiefly of two of the
worst droughts in our history; and (3) that trade agree-
ment concessions on farm products, while facilitating
somewhat the entry of certain products, have on the whole
43been a very minor factor in the Import situation.
43. Statement made by Francis B. Sayre before the House
during Hearings on House Joint Resolution No. 96, commenc
Ing January 21, 1937, "The Conditions in 1934 which the
Trade Agreements Act was Designed Remedy."
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Another point in opposition has been that of
the generalization of concessions, the granting to all
countries (except such as the President excepts on the
ground of discrimination against us) the benefits of
any concession made to a particular coimtry in a trade
agreement. It is argued that this practice necessarily
means a loss to the United States because as regards the
imports from third countries we give something for
nothing
.
Evaluation of the Trade Agreements at this time
is extremely difflcult--almost impossible. We do not have
sufficient data. Then, too, comes the question of how
to scientifically analyze the whole question of imports
and exports, and all the factors which lie at the roots
of both, production, price levels, gold movements, in-
ternational investments, exchange rates, etc. With these
factors influencing trade, who can say which affects it--
8uid how much.
The only view we can take right now is that of
noting the imports and exports between the United States
and those countries with which trade agreements have
been concluded, have been stimulated; diplomatic rela-
tions between countries are, at least, aiming at some
peaceful state and our leadership in Washington is at-
tempting to provide an outlet for our domestic surpluses.
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Summary The adventure into trade agreements Is
trying to break down the prohibitive barriers and result-
ing retaliation measures, set up by the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff. They appear to have been a profitable investment
in American statesmanship and a sound and workmanlike
piece of tariff bargaining in which we have held our own
with some exceedingly shrewd neighbors
.
The exponents of the Trade Agreements do not
claim for them perfection, '-^'hey have taken steps for-
ward in the right direction. Since they have only been
authorized for three years, and a good part of that time
consumed in promotion and drafting, we cannot expect to
have too much upon which to draw conclusions.
It is because of this very fact that we owe it
to the program and the statesmen behind it to give them
an extension of time to improve their agreements and
work toward negotiations with the major countries still
outside the paling. The agreements had to bredk down the
hatred and bitterness following the high protectionist
Hawley-Smoot Tariff before they could begin to build
reciprocity. Naturally their steps were impeded.
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CHAPTER VIII
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM vs RECIPROCAL TRADE RELATIONS
The world stands today at one of the major
crossroads of human development and progress . On the
one hand lies the oroad well-beaten highway of normal
economic interchange between nations; on the other lies
the deceptive by-path of economic nationalism, along
whose devious course many countries have already traveled
for some distance. Shall we follov; this new and unfamil-
44
iar detour or shall we continue along the main highway?
Case for The plea for economic nationalism or
Nationalism
economic independence brings in a dis-
cussion of protective tariffs, since our reason for
having a high protective tariff is to produce industrial
self-sufficiency. We say we must have it, because it
lessens the distress due to possible military disasters
in time of war. Those in favor of this say that war is
inevitable, and during peace the nation must prepare to
protect itself by fostering and widening its range of
domestic industries. Hence, the high protective tariff
to "protect" infant industries. When new industries
spring up, if they are to exist, we must have a high
44. Taken from an address by W. E. Dunn, Assistant
Director, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, De-
partment of Commerce, before a meeting of the Institute
of Public Affairs, Southern Methodist University, Dallas,
Texas, March 12, 1936.
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enough tariff to keep out any products from other coun-
tries that would compete with those of the infant industry.
It is claimed that domestic trade should be en-
couraged because it draws the citizens of a country to-
gether and makes them feel their mutual dependence, while
international trade, being cosmopolitan, tends to the
separation of citizens. This argument characterizes
tariff controversies.
Danger of Economic nationalism, which represents
Nationalism
an extreme in protection, and other
restrictive measures, carries grave seeds of danger from
a democratic form of government. The threat of dictator-
ship becomes more serious as nationalism is increasingly
applied. A dictatorship cannot succeed and continue un-
less there Is absolute control over the economic destinies
of a country. It. is only by restricting the commercial
and cultural Intercourse of the masses of their people
with other peoples of the world that dictators can main-
tain themselves in power.
Nationalism, through internal maladjustments
that It brings about, creates a series of Internal pres-
sures which prompt governments to seek relief by recourse
to military ventures abroad (Italy and Ethopla) . A
properly adjusted and gradually adapted liberal trade
program is, therefore, antithetical to the growth of
\
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dictatorship and war and an important safeguard for the
maintenance of our form of democratic government.
Prom this point, let us go to a consideration
of points in favor of foreign trade and reciprocal rela-
tions .
Reciprocal Some of the commonly cited advantages
Relations
of foreign trade are that there are
certain products which we must get abroad that we do not
produce at all in this country, such as coffee, silk,
rubber, tea, manganese, and other minerals. There are
other products upon which we are partly dependent to fill
our domestic needs, such as aluminum, sugar, wool, vege-
tables, etc. Obviously it is to our advantage to import
these products. If we did not import them, great incon-
venience and hardship would result.
A volume of imports
,
large enough to be fairly
competitive but not disruptive because of excessively
low prices, has a stimulating effect upon domestic pro-
duction. Just as competition within a country exercises
a healthy influence and works generally to prompt and
bring about greater efficiency in production, so do im-
ports from other countries have a similar effect. Several
of our most inefficient low-wage industries have grown
up behind high protective walls, while other industries
subjected to a reasonable amount of foreign competition
in domestic markets have reported a more efficient and
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expansive development. Imports serve as an additional
discipline that keeps domestic producers alert, and
doubtless influences a greater long-run improvement in
efficiency, thus resulting in lower prices to the consumer.
In order to maintain the traditionally high
standard of living of this nation and at the same time
maintain economic peace, we must allow other nations to
sell to us as well as buy from us. World trade has al-
ready been developed to the point where it would be dan-
gerous to the economic peace of the world to stop it.
Our standard of living depends upon our finding
a market for our production and is also dependent upon
the importation of certain commodities which v;e do not
produce
.
Political boundaries and government control
follow strictly national lines, but economic boundaries
and productive peculiarities follow international lines.
It has been natural, therefore, that international reali-
ties should be obscured by national sentiment.
Foreign trade is further complicated by the
fact that economically nations have not progressed uni-
formly. As a result, the comp£^?ative standards of living
show great differences. This means inequities in wages,
costs, and prices, which make mutual trading relations
more difficult. From both an economic and social view-
point, the objective of the human race is a greater total
production and a more adequate distribution of the
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benefits of this production. The problem becomes that
of doing everything possible to assist in improving the
standards of living of the more backward countries so
that they may make greater contributions toward total
world productivity. The only way this can be accom-
plished is through the establishment of a more ef-
fective basis for world trade. The concrete problem of
the United States is that of developing a balanced mid-
dle-way program which will contribute to the improvement
of world conditions v^lle bringing about constantly en-
45
larging benefits to our own country.
Foreign trade is an integral part of economic
activity. When this one trade thoroughfare is closed
off, congestion results and the entire economic system
is adversely affected.
Nationalism in its broadest aspects implies
that the responsibilities of countries stop with their
boundaries. Internationalism, on the other hand, signi-
fies that each country has a responsibility in improving
the welfare and assuring a safe future for humanity.
It is ridiculous that appraisals of foreign
trade should be based upon extremes in policy and action
of either nationalism or free trade. Either absolute
nationalism or absolute free trade would be ruinous.
45. Taken from address given by Chester H. McCall,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce, before
the Houston, Texas, Foreign Trade Association, May 22,
1936, "Foreign Trade—The Middle Way".
I ti<2 J.
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Since the World War nation after nation has
surrendered to the onslaught of economic nationalism.
Tariff walls have been heightened; arbitrary quota re-
strictions against imports have been imposed; government
trading monopolies have been instituted; exchange controls
have been set up; preferential treatment and provocative
discriminations have become the accepted procedure in
trade .^^
With the unprecedented heightening of old trade
barriers and building up of new ones following 1929 has
come a staggering drop in international trade. Between
1929 and 1933 the value of international trade dropped
to about a third of its former value.
Unless nations succeed in disarming economi-
cally and taking common steps for the liberalization of
world trade, economic breakdown is inevitable. Break-
down means unemployment, starvation wages, bankruptcies
and impaired standards of living, and sooner or later
armed conflict.
The fact is that international trade is an
essential part of our national economy. The value of
our cotton, our wheat, our lard, our automobiles, and
the like, depends directly upon whether or not we can
find markets for them. Value attaches to goods because
46. Taken from address given by Francis B. Sayre, at
the World Trade Conference, Detroit, Michigan, March 10,
1936, "Trade Policies and Peace".
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they can be exchanged for other goods. A nation's
wealth is as vitally dependent upon the possession of
markets, to which its goods have access, as upon the
possession of the goods themselves. National wealth
depends upon trade.
Of vital consequence is the effect of un-
salable surpluses on domestic enterprises. Unsold sur-
pluses, by glutting home markets, demoralize the prices
received for that part of the output or crop sold at
home and thereby spread havoc and cause dislocation
throughout the industry or occupation. The resulting
repercussions are nation-wide and affect producers who
themselves do not sell abroad. Unquestionably one of
the substantial causes for the widespread suffering and
unemployment which we have been experiencing since 1929
has been the loss of foreign markets.
Under a system of self-sufficiency the only
alternative for unsalable surpluses is an arbitrary
restriction of production; and this would involve not
only a lessening of national wealth and income and
thereby reduce and limit the American standard of
living, but it would also necessitate a degree of reg-
imentation and strait-jacketing of agriculture and
business quite incompatible with the American spirit.
Summary It is up to us to decide, then, what
course is the better for the United States and which one
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we, as citizens, will encourage. The underlying philos-
ophy of this bend toward nationalism is articulated in
trade by the "Buy American" slogan. It comprehends all
those narrow policies of trade exclusion and discrimina-
tion which come under the general term of economic
nationalism. It is based on the notion that the United
States not only can, but should, preserve a national
economy separate and apart from that of the rest of the
world.
For a nation like the United States with an
intricate and hi gjily complex industrial organization
and with economic ramifications extending to every
corner of the globe to go in for economic nationalism
or economic self-sufficiency would be sheer suicide.
Foreign markets are chiefly important for the part they
play in making possible a large and expanding prosperity
47
for industries in this country.
This conclusion is borne out by the experience
of other nations yftiich have adopted such policies. Ger-
many probably provides the best illustration of how such
policies work out. That country not only exercises rigid
control over imports and exports, but its control over the
internal life of the nation is no less thoroughgoing.
47. Reciprocity—A National Policy for Foreign Trade,
by William S. Culbertson, published by McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., Whittlesey House, 1937, Page 145.
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When we view the situation of countries like
Germany and Italy, which are operating under a dictator-
ship, with self-sufficiency one of the nations' objectives,
even without more than a cursory knowledge of conditions
there, I'm sure we feel that that is not what we want for
the United States. A way out--or at least an attempt to
find the way out—is presented to us through the Trade
Agreements v\fiiich aim to produce equable trade relation-
ships .
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CHAPTER IX
FUTURE POLICY FOR FOREIGN TRADE
Review of Thus far, through the brief reviewing
Problem
of trade policies, reciprocity experi-
ences, and tariff background of the United States, we
have seen something of the trade relationship between
the United States and foreign countries. We have noted
through the Trade Agreements concluded, the attempts
which are now being made by forward-looking statesmen to
re-invigorate our trade and encourage trade highways to
again function for two-way traffic.
The problem put before us is, I think, one to
be considered carefully from various angles. Should we
have a national policy in regard to our commercial re-
lationships with other countries, or should we leave
tariff and reciprocal agreements to the political parties
for them to take sides on, and approve or disapprove, ir-
regardless of economic necessities. There comes the
question of whether economic isolation is possible when
we are so closely related to other countries through our
foreign-born citizens , to say nothing of our funds being
invested abroad.
These, and a host of other questions arise, as
we consider vdiat our future policy should be in regard to
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the whole question of reciprocity and Commercial Treaties.
The "New Deal" administration apparently decided that our
move should be toward fostering reciprocal trade relations
and to that end, the United States Congress authorized the
President, through the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, to
start negotiations with foreign countries.
We have set down heretofore, the process through
which data is collected, evaluated, and finally accepted,
before an agreement is drafted and submitted for approval.
A big step forward in this program is the granting to the
President this pov^er of negotiating, instead of insisting
that each agreement come to Congress for ratification.
In this way activities are speeded up—and agreements do
not rim the risk of being tabled, a procedure which is
felt to be valuable in diplomatic affairs.
Congress limited the authority of the President
by stating the confines above or below which he may not
go in revising schedules. By doing this, the trade agree-
ments may be more flexible as to duties, and can more
easily and accurately reflect the changing economic con-
ditions. The lag of legislative action behind economic
change is usually so great that emergencies come and are
acute before cognizance can be taken of them.
Extension of Now that we have an instrument to make
Trade Agreements
an opening wedge in reciprocal trade
agreements, it iirould seem that it might be wise for us to

99
continue using it. We vdll concede the point that these
agreements are in no way perfect, but they are an attempt
In the right direction. Eventually, with continued re-
search and study, they will be refined until they are as
adequate to our economic needs and national well-being as
it is possible for agreements made by a composite group
of hioman beings can be.
A law extending the provisions of the Act for
another period of three years was passed, and so there is
another period in which we can trace the effect of those
agreements already in effect, and on the basis of those,
evaluate to some extent the worth of the agreements. We
can learn from them things to do, and things not to do.
We can learn from the hope of future international nego-
tiations. Since it is an experiment, we expect it to be
changed if better ways are found of solving the situation.
The future of foreign relationships lies, I
think, in these trade agreements or in some liberal trade
policies, vdilch are reached after deep and careful study,
and are administered as a national policy—not as a plank
in a political platform.
The United States seems to be in a better posi-
tion than other nations to take the initiative in this
attempt at international cooperation, and as a leader
might be expected to assume that responsibility. Par-
ticularly might she do this, when the surpluses of her
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production need favorable outlets, else production be
curtailed.
"We have come therefore to a period in our
national history which demands in the interests of
national prosperity lower and more flexible tariffs.
Imports should be viewed as a payment for foreign peoples
of their debts and obligations to the American people.
The ability to absorb increasing imports is evidence of
national prosperity and a rising national standard of
living; they are evidence of the successful disposition,
in foreign markets, of surplus goods produced by American
labor and capital and our surplus savings. A discrimin-
ating increase in imports is one of the means not only
to dispose of our accumulating surpluses but also to
increase the volume of trade which, when it comes, will
be the evidence of real recovery.
Economic We have become a world state, economi-
World
State cally speaking, whether we like it or
not. Our overseas expansion will go on, whether we like
it or not. i'^or the time being we are in a period of
pause. This one of the reasons why we do not have the
prosperity which we long for. The statistics of world
trade still reflect depression. As large industries re-
turn to their normal production they will seek markets
in other countries. As investors return to the invest-
ment market they will seek opportunities to invest their
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funds abroad. statesmanship will adjust our policy
to these natural tendencies. In the workaday world an
intelligent choice of policies is necessary. I know of
no substitute for judgment and wisdom based on knowledge
and experience.
Need for 'those individuals and classes who cherish
International
Cooperation with special concern the political and
economic traditions of our nation can save the spirit and
essence of those traditions by giving American resources
and enterprise a world stage on which to perform. They
can render unnecessary socialistic schemes and measures
and preserve sound nationalism by liberalizing our com-
mercial policy at home and by advocating multilateral
treaties and international economic relations which are
unregulated and which are dealt with at present ineffec-
tively by nations acting singly and bargaining two by two."
48. Reciprocity—A National Policy for Foreign Trade,
by William S. Culbertson, published by McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., Whittlesey House, 1937, Page 55.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
With this brief, and necessarily limited, sur-
vey of some of the "basic factors which constitute our
foreign trade policy, we arrive at various conclusions.
It seems to be acknowledged by many that a
good deal of the difficulty with the foreign trade rela-
tions of the United States has been in the attitude of
the people and government toward it, and the subsequent
action taken.
The United States has formulated policies par-
ticularly for export trade, accepting import trade as to
be coped with only if, and when, necessary. The attempt
seems to have been to sell our commodities in favorable
markets, assuming, of course, that foreign countries
should be willing and anxiously awaiting them, while, at
the same time, any commodities which these self-same
countries attempted to sell into our country, were met by
a solid, sky-high tariff wall.
Somehow, because of the proportions which foreign
trade must necessarily assume, one of the fundamentals of
human existence, that "giving and taking" has been over-
looked. It is too often true that the facts closest to
us, and which ought to be apparent, are too close to be
in our line of vision and are obscured in our search for
-J ItfO
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greater ends. This business of trading must be remembered
to be a two-way highway and traffic will not continually
move in one direction only.
The United States is no longer a debtor nation
but continues to act as one, by preventing goods from
coming into the country by restrictions, but seeking a
market out to which our goods may go. The countries who
owe money to the United States are having no opportunity
to pay their debts because they have limited markets for
their exports
.
An attempt to remedy this situation has been
made through these Commercial Treaties which have been,
and are being, formulated -under the Act of June 1934.
The way will probably be slow, but the fever for economic
nationalism will have to be checked before too much pro-
gress can be achieved.
It is recognized that the foreign trade of the
United States is small compared with its domestic trade,
but it is an integral part of the existence of the nation
and its cessation would mean a partial crippling, at
least, of the effectiveness of the country. Foreign trade
seems a logical outlet for commodities which countries
produce to the best advantages. Then, too, there are prod-
ucts which some countries just do not have and must have.
How else, except through foreign trade can they be obtained.
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Perhaps there are those v/ho would, say that
there should he no place in Economics for the study of
human behavior, but it must needs be a part of it.
Whether or not we insist upon "living alone" as a na-
tion, there still remains the fact that the other na-
tions do exist, are carrying on relationships with each
other, and eventually we must be aware of that existence.
It does seem to me. In this question of foreign trade that
just as "man cannot live unto himself alone," neither can
nations live unto themselves alone.
Just how, then, relationships can be best
carried out for mutual benefit remains to be seen. Since
these relationships, their creation and guidance, must be
in the hands of human beings, there will be adjustments,
which will have to be made from time to time to meet new
situations and circumstances, but it does seem as if
these changes could be made without an upheaval of all
the good that already has been proved to exist in the
present arrangements. Reciprocity should be a national
—
not a partisan policy.
FINIS
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